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Executive summary
An aid worker’s personal security is impacted by the 
interplay between where the aid worker is, who they 
are, and their role and organisation. As employers, 
aid organisations have a duty of care to take all 
reasonable measures to protect their staff from 
foreseeable risks, including those that emerge due to 
an aid worker’s personal characteristics – for example, 
biological sex, gender, ethnicity, cognitive and physical 
abilities, sexual orientation, etc.
When personal identity characteristics interact 
with both the context and the aid worker’s role 
and organisation, the individual’s employing non-
governmental organisation (NGO) has a duty of 
care to inform staff of any resulting risk and to put in 
place measures to mitigate and respond to these 
risks. The failure to understand how personal profile 
characteristics impact personal security can have 
implications for the security of both the team as a 
whole and for the individual aid worker, as well as 
causing serious security, legal and reputational issues 
for employing organisations.
EISF has, therefore, undertaken the following research 
to better understand whether diversity is systematically 
addressed by aid organisations within their security 
risk management systems, and what challenges aid 
organisations face in relation to managing the security 
of aid workers while being mindful of their diversity. 
The primary objectives of this research were to identify 
examples of good practice, and then provide guidance 
to aid organisations on how to balance staff security 
and duty of care obligations while still respecting their 
employees’ rights to privacy, equality and inclusion.
This research paper is targeted at staff members within 
NGOs who have a responsibility for ensuring the 
security and wellbeing of staff members - for example, 
security focal points, human resource (HR) specialists, 
and senior managers. This research paper is not 
targeted at aid workers with minority profiles. All 
recommendations in this document must be adapted 
to the specific needs and capacity of each organisation. 
Through a literature review, survey and key informant 
interviews, the research has primarily found that 
although most NGOs do not systematically address 
diversity of profiles in security risk management, some 
organisations do so in a non-systematic way, whereas 
others are particularly supportive of certain profiles. The 
findings suggest that a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach to 
staff identity, especially where personal characteristics 
are hidden, is common in security risk management 
approaches within many aid organisations.
Individual, organisational and 
context-related vulnerabilities 
interact with internal threats 
from within the organisation 
and external threats from the 
context. These interactions 
affect the risks faced by the 
individual and the organisation.
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This can partly be the result of the sector’s commitment 
to equality, which has meant that many organisations 
approach their staff as a homogenous group. The 
research has found that while the principle of equality 
is extremely important, perceiving all aid workers 
as the same does not allow for effective security risk 
management. Responses to the research from aid 
workers with minority profiles evidence a desire on 
the part of these individuals that identity and risk be 
considered more openly and systematically by aid 
organisations as part of their security risk management 
policies and procedures. Identifying different risks 
for different staff and putting in place differentiated 
mitigation measures does not suggest that staff are 
unequal but rather that they are different.
The research, furthermore, found that aid workers 
who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
queer or intersex (LGBTQI) or as being a person with a 
disability are more concerned about internal threats 
than external threats to their security. A number of 
contributors to this study voiced that while at work 
they feel they need to conceal certain aspects of their 
identity to protect themselves, which in some cases has 
had a profound impact on their mental health.
The fundamental challenge NGOs face, however, when 
trying to integrate diversity into their security risk 
management policies and practices is the concern that 
security decisions made on the basis of personal profiles 
could be perceived as a possible infringement of aid 
workers’ rights to privacy and non-discrimination. 
In high-risk situations, duty of care obligations may 
compel decision-makers within organisations to ask 
personal profile questions, which staff may refuse 
to answer, and make decisions that discriminate 
based on personal profiles if done transparently, 
systematically, proportionately, and on the basis of 
sound security information in pursuit of a legitimate 
aim. A failure to consider personal profiles, where 
there is a specific known risk, can equally bring an 
employer before a court of law for failing to meet duty 
of care obligations, should an incident occur.
When it comes to internal threats, security focal 
points interviewed as part of this research remain 
unsure of their role in managing risks emerging from 
harassment and discrimination, and report not having 
the knowledge and skills to mitigate security risks 
for different profiles, including ensuring these are 
addressed in security trainings. Security focal points 
and other key decision-makers, including HR staff, 
would benefit from being appropriately trained and 
empowered to support staff with a diverse range of 
personal profiles.
Decision-makers should consider how they can diversify 
representation in their organisation, particularly among 
senior leadership and on boards of trustees, to ensure 
that the concerns of a diverse range of employees are 
considered in organisational culture and processes, 
including security risk management. This should be 
complemented with a supportive structure that allows 
employees with security concerns about their personal 
profile to seek security advice with confidence.
Fortunately, there is evidence of a growing 
understanding within the aid sector that personal 
identity profiles should play an important role in 
aid organisations’ security risk management. This 
is supported by recent learnings from the #AidToo 
movement. Unfortunately, there is still a lack of clarity 
on how to tackle this issue. Through the publication 
of this research paper, EISF hopes to improve 
understanding on how diversity in aid worker profiles 
can impact personal and organisational security, 
and to provide practical recommendations to key 
stakeholders in the aid sector on how to develop an 
inclusive security risk management system.
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The security of an aid worker is strongly influenced by 
the interplay between where the aid worker is, who 
they are, which organisation they work for, and what 
their role is. However, currently, many aid organisations’ 
security risk management processes focus primarily on 
external threats when assessing risks and mitigating 
against them, while often failing to systematically assess 
how the identities of staff within the organisation can 
affect the individual’s and the organisation’s risks from 
internal and external threats alike. 
Recent years have seen an increasing focus on how 
gender affects security within the aid sector, with the 
development of gender-sensitive personal security 
training as well as the growing integration of gender 
within aid organisations’ security policies and plans. 
EISF has been looking at the issue of gender and 
security for over a decade and contributed to the 
debate with the publication of the EISF paper ‘Gender 
and Security’ in 2012. The urgency of looking at aid 
worker security through an identity lens peaked in 
2017-2018 with the widespread allegations of sexual 
misconduct across the aid sector, known as the 
#AidToo movement, which evidenced the vulnerability 
of aid workers to internal threats, not just external ones, 
due to their personal profiles.
Identity, however, does not begin and end with an 
individual’s gender. A person’s security can be affected 
by, among other characteristics, their ethnicity, their 
cognitive and physical abilities, and their sexual 
orientation, as well as the intersectionality of all of 
these identity characteristics.
How many aid organisations are prepared when it 
comes to supporting the safety and security of staff 
members with disabilities? How do organisations 
provide guidance, if at all, on security for lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, queer1 or intersex (LGBTQI) staff 
members when deploying them to countries where 
acting on their sexual orientation, gender identity or 
gender expression (SOGIE)2 is potentially a criminal 
offence or not culturally accepted? Do security focal 
points and other decision-makers consider the race or 
ethnicity of aid workers before asking them to work in 
regions where historical and present-day conflicts may 
place them at greater risk than their colleagues?
All staff have their own specific profile, and each 
profile will exhibit different risk levels depending on the 
context in which they work. Employers in the aid sector 
should therefore put in place reasonable procedures 
and systems that improve the security of all their staff, 
while being mindful of their diversity.
The purpose of this paper is to explore, through a 
literature review, survey and key informant interviews, 
the most effective ways for humanitarian and 
development organisations to develop inclusive security 
risk management systems and processes, which take 
into account the diverse profiles of aid workers, while still 
respecting their rights to equality, diversity and inclusion. 
This document is not targeted at aid workers with 
minority profiles as the recommendations shared in this 
paper aim to address organisational security practices 
and not personal security.
The two primary objectives of the research are:
•  To understand whether there are examples of 
good practice in which employers within the 
public, private and third sectors approach staff 
security risk management, while at the same time 
meeting ethical and legal obligations in relation 
to equality, diversity and inclusion, particularly in 
relation to ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, 
gender identity and gender expression.
•  To provide guidance to humanitarian and 
development organisations on how to balance 
staff security and duty of care obligations while 
still respecting their employees’ rights to privacy, 
equality and inclusion.
Introduction
1  The term ‘queer’ has in the past been used as a homophobic slur, and can still sometimes be used as such. However, in recent years the term has been reclaimed by the LGBTQI community.  
Queer is used in this document as an all-encompassing term to refer to anyone who does not identify as entirely heterosexual or cisgender.
2  Everyone has a sexual orientation, gender expression and gender identity. SOGIE is not a term that is specific to LGBTQI individuals.
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To meet these objectives, this paper sought to answer 
three primary questions:
1.  What security risk management challenges  
do aid workers with minority profiles face  
during recruitment, deployment and  
everyday employment?
2.  What challenges do security focal points  
and human resource staff face in the 
recruitment and security risk management  
of aid workers with minority profiles?
3.  Are there examples of good practice of 
inclusive security risk management from the 
private, public or third sector that can  
be applicable for NGOs?
Through key findings from the research, this paper 
highlights the challenges that have been identified, and 
concludes with practical recommendations for NGOs on 
how to improve the security of aid workers while 
respecting their rights to privacy, equality, diversity and 
inclusion. Recommendations are based on examples of 
good practice and should always be adapted to suit the 
needs and capacity of each organisation.
The term ‘diverse profiles’ in this paper refers to the 
personal identity characteristics of an individual, for 
example, their age, biological sex, gender, ethnicity, 
sexuality, religion, etc. Every aid worker has a personal 
profile that is specific to them, and the term diverse 
profile is used to recognise the diversity of all aid 
worker profiles. For the purposes of containing the 
scope of this research project, this paper draws 
examples primarily from aid workers of varying non-
white ethnicities, those who identify as living with a 
disability, and those who identify as LGBTQI. That said, 
all aid workers have diverse profiles brought about 
by their personal identities, organisational roles and 
relationships to operational contexts, and therefore 
most of the recommendations presented in this paper 
are purposefully broad to be inclusive of all possible 
aid worker profiles. 
The response to this project has been overwhelmingly 
positive. A survey conducted to gather information for 
this research paper returned nearly 250 responses, 
with more than half of those surveyed indicating they 
would be willing to take part in a follow-up interview. 
Key informant interviews were conducted, with the 
average amount of time per interview taking twice as 
long as originally scheduled. There was a high level 
of personal and professional engagement with the 
project both in the data collection and through the 
EISF network, with input from sector experts and EISF 
member organisations. 
Many individuals shared difficult stories about their 
lives, security incidents, and personal and professional 
crises they have had to navigate as a result of existing 
limitations around systems and NGO management 
understanding of staff diversity when managing 
security. These individuals contributed with the hope 
that they would change attitudes and practices within 
the aid sector.
This paper contributes to a growing body of research 
and builds upon previous work by EISF and others 
in this area. In 2012, EISF published the ‘Gender 
and Security’ paper, which sought to draw out the 
importance of humanitarian aid workers’ gender in 
understanding security risks and implementing risk 
management processes.3 This report was followed by 
a workshop in 2016, held jointly between EISF and RedR 
UK, to better understand the risks to and experiences 
of LGBTQI aid workers. The workshop resulted in the 
publication of a report, which pointed to systemic 
problems in approaches to security risk management, 
and a lack of engagement with the principles of 
equality, diversity and inclusion.4
EISF has taken forward these discussions by carrying 
out this research to further identify the challenges and 
recommendations for developing an inclusive security 
risk management culture that considers the diverse 
profiles of aid workers. EISF continues to engage in 
discussions with its member organisations and sector 
experts on this issue.
This document was developed to support NGO staff 
responsible for the security and wellbeing of aid 
workers, and is not aimed at aid workers with minority 
profiles. Managing the security of aid workers while 
considering their diversity is the responsibility of a 
multitude of key actors within an organisation – in 
particular, security focal points, human resources staff, 
senior management and line managers, as well as 
general project/programme managers who have a 
security responsibility within aid organisations. This 
research paper therefore targets all of these actors. 
Please note that this paper is aimed at practitioners, 
and therefore does not aim to be an academic 
research paper.
3  To learn more specifically about gender and security risk management, please refer to this publication: Persaud (2012). The current research paper aims not to repeat content already shared  
in the 2012 Gender and Security document, but rather to build upon it.
4  RedR UK & EISF (2016).
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Key terms and concepts
Diverse profiles
The term ‘diverse profiles’ in this paper refers to the 
personal identity characteristics of an individual, for 
example, their age, biological sex, gender, ethnicity, 
sexuality, religion, etc. The term is used to challenge 
the perception that aid workers are a homogenous 
group, particularly when it comes to the risks they face. 
All aid workers have a diverse profile brought about 
by the intersectionality between the different aspects 
of their personal identities. This intersectional personal 
identity furthermore interplays with an individual’s 
organisational role and their relationship to their 
operational context.
A better understanding of this interplay between the 
different facets of an aid worker’s identity can help 
an organisation understand the security risks faced 
by staff. For example, a young, local female aid 
worker will experience different, and likely greater, 
risks than an older international male colleague in 
a patriarchal society. When considering the security 
risks faced by aid workers it is important to consider 
the intersectionality of an individual’s identity and the 
interplay with external factors to assess risk.
The strength of adopting this type of holistic approach 
to identity is that it shows how the different strands of 
power, identity, ability and choice intersect to influence 
the conditions in which aid workers live and work.5
To limit the scale and ensure coherence, this paper 
gathered primary data on three areas of personal 
identity across a range of organisational roles and 
operating contexts:
•  Disability6
•  Sexual orientation, gender identity and expression 
(SOGIE)7
•  Race and ethnicity
These three profile groups were chosen at the 
inception of this research because preliminary 
evidence suggested that there was a particular lack 
of information about the security challenges faced by 
aid workers with these personal profiles, and concerns 
from security focal points on how best to manage the 
risks faced by them. Throughout the paper, reference 
is made to minority profiles, which includes but is not 
limited to the three groups listed above.
Although these areas are highlighted, the principles 
and reflections in this research paper and the 
conclusions drawn aim to be applicable to all types of 
profiles for effective security risk management.
Fig 1: The interplay of identity and  
security risk management8
Age
Race/Ethnicity
Nationality
Religion
Gender/Sex
Sexuality
Physical/Mental health and ability
Marital/Partnership status
Physical appearance
Previous professional experience
Individual 
Intersectional identity characteristics
Seniority
Contract type (e.g. employee/
consultant; local/international)
Contract duration
Job title
Travel obligations
Accommodation
Partnership organisations
Post relationship with external actors 
(e.g. government)
O
rganisation
Legal (national laws and their 
enforcement, including lack of 
protections)
Cultural attitudes
Rural/Urban/Regional differences
Bilateral agreements with employees’ 
country of citizenship
O
perational context
5  Slim (2018).
6  Please note that individuals who contributed to this research were those who self-identified as having a disability. This research paper does not distinguish between different types of disability,  
nor does it discuss mental health in relation to disability due to time and length limitations.
7  While ‘gender’ is often used interchangeably with ‘biological sex’, this paper focuses primarily on gender – that is, how an individual’s biological sex can determine their perception and role in society, or how an individual 
personally identifies their gender. It is important to note that when it comes to security risk management, how others perceive an individual’s ‘gender/sex’ can sometimes be the most important factor to consider.
8  Adapted from Kumar (2017).
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Disability
Disability refers to a range of impairments that may be 
cognitive, developmental, intellectual, mental, physical, 
sensory, or a combination of these. Impairments also 
vary in the degree to which they affect a person and 
may change over the course of someone’s life.9 For 
example, a person with a disability may have dyslexia, 
autism, or have a physical impairment that can range 
from mild to severe. Therefore, defining disability is not 
a straightforward task. A great number of disabilities 
may also not be visible. Some hidden disabilities that 
are common within the aid sector can relate to mental 
health, including severe cases of post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD).10
The international NGO, CBM, defines five schools of 
thought when it comes to the ways that institutional 
and organisational policies approach disability (see 
figure 2): the charity, the medical, the economic, the 
social, and the human rights models.  
Broadly speaking, the charity model sees disability as 
an affliction affecting an individual who subsequently 
needs to be cared for by others, while the economic 
model defines disability according to the impact of 
that disability on an individual’s economic productivity. 
The medical model defines people as disabled based 
upon their individual impairments or differences, 
and focuses on identifying what is wrong with the 
person and their medical needs. In many cases the 
medical model positions people with disabilities as 
passive receivers of services. In contrast, the social 
model says that disability is caused by the way that 
society is organised, and is more concerned with 
removing barriers that restrict life choices for people 
with disabilities. In this model, people with disabilities 
are central figures in identifying barriers and designing 
solutions. Finally, the human rights model foregrounds 
the idea that people with disabilities have a right to 
access within society on an equal basis with others.
By placing these models side by side, it is possible 
to see how implicit and explicit organisational 
understandings of disability will affect approaches 
to security risk management in policy and practice. 
For example, according to both CBM and Humanity 
and Inclusion (formerly Handicap International), 
organisations that adopt a medical model are likely to 
produce more protectionist attitudes towards staff with 
disabilities in recruitment, deployment and everyday 
employment. On the other hand, organisations 
adopting the social model are more likely to explore 
how people with disabilities can work in different roles 
and promote a more enabling environment for all staff. 
It is important to note that from a programme quality 
perspective, having individuals with disabilities on 
programme teams makes it more likely that the 
Fig 2: Disability model descriptions
Model type Brief model description
Charity model ‘We feel sorry for you; let us give you something.’
Economic model ‘You cannot work; this is going to cost us.’
Medical model ‘There is something wrong with you; let us fix you.’
Social model ‘There is something wrong with society; let’s change society to be more inclusive.’
Human rights model ‘This is a human rights issue; we must find ways to address it.’
9  Section 6 of the UK Equality Act 2010 states ‘the impairment has a substantial, and long-term adverse effect, on their ability to carry out normal day to day activities.’
10  This research paper does not differentiate between types of disability, nor does it at any point aim to distinguish, or debate the overlap, between mental health and disability.  
Please consult expert advice on this and adapt recommendations to the relevant organisation’s policies and practices.
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programme will meet the needs of people with 
disabilities. Therefore, this paper aims to follow the 
social model of disability for balancing the rights of 
staff with disabilities with an organisation’s duty of  
care obligations.
Sexual orientation, gender identity and expression 
(SOGIE)
SOGIE is a relatively new term which tries to capture  
the distinctions between biological sex, who 
individuals are romantically and sexually attracted to, 
how individuals understand their gender identity and 
how they express their gender identity (see figure 3). 
SOGIE is a useful concept because it foregrounds the 
idea that individuals have a sexual orientation, gender 
identity and expression.11 Some categories of SOGIE 
include lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer  
and intersex (LGBTQI).12
As of April 2018, 74 countries continue to criminalise 
consensual same-sex relations with punishments 
including prison sentences, flogging and the death 
penalty.13 As a point of comparison, marriage 
between people of the same sex is legally recognised 
in 25 countries.14 This disparity creates the unique 
situation that aid workers may be legally married in 
one country yet could face the death penalty if their 
marriage is discovered while working in another. As 
well as legal threats, the 2017 ILGA global survey on 
attitudes towards SOGIE showed that 45% and 33% of 
respondents in Africa and Asia respectively, agreed 
that same-sex romantic or sexual activity should 
be criminalised. By contrast, more than half of the 
respondents from Europe and the Americas believe 
that same sex activity should not be criminalised.15 The 
report evidences a growing divide between global 
attitudes towards individuals who identify as LGBTQI, 
which has significant implications for aid organisations 
employing a global workforce and operating 
internationally. A recent report by IARAN argues that 
the social exclusion of LGBTQI people globally could be 
classified as a protracted humanitarian crisis.16
If not effectively managed, these threats have the 
potential to create additional layers of physical, legal 
and cultural risk for LGBTQI aid workers, and those who 
are perceived to fall into these profiles. The grave legal 
and cultural threats that individuals with these profiles 
may disproportionately face are often concentrated in 
many contexts where aid work takes place.17
Fig 3: Understanding sexual orientation, gender identity and expression18
Sex: The physical sex characteristics (e.g. hormones, 
genitalia, chromosomes) we are born with. Words used 
to describe physical sex characteristics : male, female, 
intersex.
Gender identity: How we define our gender based on 
culturally specific ideas. Words used to describe gender 
identify: masculine, feminine, two-spirit (Native American), 
genderqueer, hijra (Indian), transgender.
Some people describe those whose biological sex and 
gender identity align as being cisgender. Where biological 
sex observed at birth and gender identities  
are inconsistent, people are described as transgender.
Gender expression: How we present our gender in  
our actions, dress and demeanour. Words associated  
with gender expression: butch, femme, androgynous,  
drag queen/king.
Sexual orientation/attraction: How we define who we 
are romantically and sexually attracted to. Words used 
to describe sexual orientation: heterosexual, straight, 
homosexual, gay, lesbian, bisexual, asexual, pansexual.
Identity
Sex
AttractionExpression
11  There are some who argue that they do not have a gender identity or expression. It is important to recognise this debate in order to develop a strong understanding of gender issues. However, in 
order to maintain the security risk management focus of this research paper, SOGIE is described in this section in the most general terms and this approach is reflected in the rest of the document.
12  For a detailed description of ‘LGBTQI’, please see Kumar (2017), p. 2.
13  76 Crimes (2018).
14  Dittrich (2018).
15  Carroll & Robotham (2017).
16  IARAN (2018). 
17  Kumar (2017).
18  Adapted from the Genderbread Person (V.3) by Killermann (2015).
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It is important to note that although an aid worker may 
not be LGBTQI, they may still be perceived as such 
and would therefore face the same risks as fellow 
LGBTQI colleagues. The repercussions of not effectively 
managing this risk may affect not only the individual 
aid worker, but can have implications on how the 
organisation is perceived externally, impacting the 
overall security and reputation of the organisation.
Ethnicity, race and nationality
While race is largely defined as being based on 
physical similarities and differences (e.g. skin colour), 
ethnicity is defined by shared ancestral and cultural 
criteria. These criteria may include religion, beliefs or 
customs. Both race and ethnicity may be separate 
from or overlap with nationality, which is defined as the 
relationship between a person and the political state to 
which they belong.  
Race and nationality are the two areas of personal 
identity that security risk management processes 
are most sensitive to. Security incident data is often 
disaggregated according to whether the incident 
involved a national or international staff member, and 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) often provide 
different advice for local and international staff.
However, the relationships between nationality, race 
and ethnicity are more complex than this bi-linear 
approach suggests, particularly when considering 
differences within one national context. In these 
situations, simply assessing and mitigating for the 
different risks to national versus international staff 
is not enough. Considering race and ethnicity can 
provide important insight into this complexity, making 
it vital for security risk management to address these 
interrelationships.
‘It is important to understand that in remote rural 
areas there are often more complex ethnic differences 
and dynamics that you won’t find in urban areas. 
Therefore, when it comes to travel management within 
countries, and the security risk management of staff 
with different ethnicities this is an area where you must 
take security threats and vulnerabilities into account. 
I think that as national staff we are left behind with 
security assessments and briefings, yet we are the 
ones who are probably at greater risk when travelling 
along roads in remote areas.’
Security manager, INGO, DRC
In March 2017, seven humanitarian staff (four South 
Sudanese, three Kenyan) from a UNICEF partner, 
Grassroots Empowerment and Development 
Organisation (GREDO), were murdered in South 
Sudan. As of April 2018, this brings the total to 100 aid 
worker deaths in the region since the conflict began 
in December, 2013.19 In previous reports the UN has 
described these attacks on aid workers as ethnically 
motivated, and in at least one case an aid worker 
is known to have been shot and killed after being 
identified as a member of the Nuer ethnic group.20 
When development and humanitarian work takes 
place in areas of ethnic violence, the ethnicity of aid 
workers can produce significantly higher risks and 
requires appropriate mitigation measures.
Equality, diversity and inclusion
These three terms are often seen together and tend 
to make up a combined strategy, which outlines an 
employer’s obligations and efforts towards ensuring 
employees’ rights to equality, diversity and inclusion. 
Equality fundamentally refers to equal opportunity 
obligations as part of national and international anti-
discrimination legislation, which protect individuals 
from unjustified discrimination on the grounds of 
group membership, e.g. sex, race, disability, etc. 
Diversity refers to the make-up of the workforce 
and highlights efforts to ensure that staff from 
a variety of backgrounds and with a variety of 
personal characteristics are employed across all 
levels of the organisation. 
Inclusion means ensuring that minority groups 
have equal positions and voices to those of their 
fellow colleagues within the organisation.
‘Equality is about treating people fairly, impartially and 
without bias, and creating conditions in the workplace 
and wider society that encourage and value diversity 
and promote dignity and inclusion. This involves trying 
to redress past imbalances and respond in culturally 
sensitive ways, through a differentiated approach, 
where necessary and appropriate.’
British Council Equality Policy21
19  UNOCHA (2018).
20  Jones (2014).
21  British Council (2018). 
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These terms are based on ethical obligations as 
well as legal ones, particularly anti-discrimination 
legislation enshrined in national and international law, 
including European Union law, e.g. Article 14 in the 
European Convention on Human Rights 1952.22
  See Section 2. Legal duty of care and  
anti-discrimination.
Research methodology
Literature review
An initial literature review took place during the 
inception phase of the project and included academic 
articles, published reports, and statistics about the 
security of aid workers around the world. Key findings 
from the literature review informed the subsequent 
design of the online survey, interview schedules and a 
review of organisational policy documents.
Online survey
The research included the dissemination of an online 
survey. The aim of the survey was to understand 
perceptions around the security risk management 
of aid workers with minority profiles. The survey was 
carried out online, open to all with access to a link, and 
promoted through the EISF network, via blog posts for 
the CHS Alliance and Advanced Training Program on 
Humanitarian Action (ATHA), via the RedR members’ 
newsletter, as well as on Facebook, LinkedIn and 
Twitter. A number of other organisations were also 
kind enough to promote the research project and 
survey in their monthly newsletters. The survey was 
made available between June and August 2017, and 
received a total of 248 responses, of which:
•  36 respondents identified as LGBTQI  
(15% of all responses)
•  11 respondents identified as having a disability  
(4% of all responses)
•  51 respondents identified as non-white  
(21% of all responses)
Fig 4: Demographics of survey respondents
Respondent employment 
status
  Full- or part-time 
employment 89%
 Self-employed 5%
 Currently unemployed 3%
 Volunteers 3%
Work focus
 Programmes focused 55%
 Security focused 30%
 Other 15%
Organisation type
 INGO 70%
 Government agency 8%
 Multilateral agency 7%
 Faith-based sector 5%
 Private sector 4%
 Civil society organisation 3%
 Independent consultancies 3%
22  For a helpful summary of anti-discrimination law within Europe see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018).
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Key informant interviews
37 key informants were interviewed over Skype, in 
person or by phone. 20 key informants were security 
managers/advisors, HR specialists, or equality and 
diversity leads. Of these, 15 specialists were from NGOs, 
while 5 interviewees were from private or public sector 
organisations. Of the 37 key informants, 17 were aid 
workers who identified as LGBTQI, as having a disability 
and/or as being from a non-white ethnic background.
Key informants were either specialists, aid workers 
with a minority profile, or both. The non-NGO 
specialists were interviewed to gain an insight into how 
other sectors are dealing with the security of a globally 
mobile and diverse workforce. 
Questions differed according to each group of key 
informants. Those aimed at human resources, 
security and equality and diversity specialists sought 
information about official and ‘tacit’ organisational 
policies and practices. These questions were used 
to identify perceptions about ‘what works’, and the 
challenges and dilemmas these different professional 
roles face.
Aid workers who identified as having a minority profile 
were asked questions about personal experiences. 
These questions sought to establish an understanding 
of the challenges faced by these members of staff and 
to account for any examples of good practice.
Expert contributions
As is standard practice with all EISF publications, 
a peer review group composed of experts from 
multiple disciplines provided input into the content of 
this research paper. Their recommendations helped 
shape the focus and structure of the paper, and 
particularly served to inform the recommendations and 
guidance shared in Section 5. Inclusive security risk 
management: practical recommendations.
Staff employment profile
 International staff 76%
 National staff 24%
Location of international 
staff
 International headquarters 50%
 National or local field offices 50%
Location of national staff
 Country office 56%
 Other location 44%
Fig 5: Demographics of key informants
Specialist make-up
 NGO specialists 75%
 Private sector specialists 25%
Fig 4: Demographics of survey respondents continued
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Limitations
Although the research team specifically reached out 
to disability-focused advocacy organisations, the 
study did not manage to attract many responses 
from individuals with disabilities. More than half of 
the individuals with disabilities who responded to the 
online survey worked for a disability-focused NGO.
The sample of people who identified as LGBTQI 
primarily consisted of staff who identified as lesbian, 
gay or bisexual. There were only two responses from 
people who identified as transgender, two people 
who identified as queer, and none who indicated they 
were intersex.
Outline
This paper is divided into six overarching sections:
Section 1 unpacks why diversity in personal profiles is 
important to consider in security risk management.
Section 2 explores the interrelations between duty of 
care and privacy and anti-discrimination obligations, 
and provides guidance for what this means for aid 
organisations in practice.
Section 3 gives an overview of internal and external 
threats that may affect particular personal profiles 
disproportionately.
Section 4 aims to unpack the problems that arise 
from a failure to consider diversity in security risk 
management and describes some of the key 
challenges and findings that came out of the research 
around areas such as recruitment, deployment, and 
roles and responsibilities.
Section 5 provides practical recommendations on how 
to implement inclusive security risk management.
Section 6 provides a list of networks and resources to 
help support organisations in implementing inclusive 
security risk management.
The paper concludes with a number of annexes to 
support aid organisations in exploring how they can 
approach staff diversity through their security risk 
management processes.
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Individuals experience different types of threats 
and levels of vulnerability depending on how their 
intersectional identity characteristics interact with the 
context in which they find themselves. For example, 
a tall white Swiss man may be more vulnerable than 
a Muslim Somali female colleague at a checkpoint in 
south-central Somalia. For most national staff, a risk 
that manifests itself because of identity and context 
would usually not fall within an NGO’s duty of care 
responsibilities, as the threat and vulnerability do not 
relate to the organisation or the role the individual is 
employed to carry out.
However, when identity and context interact with 
the individual’s role and organisation, resulting in 
heightened risk, then the individual’s employing 
NGO has a duty of care to manage this risk. For 
international staff or relocated national staff23, a risk 
that manifests itself because of the interplay between 
an individual’s identity and the local context, while 
not concerning the role or organisation, would still 
need to be managed by the NGO because the staff 
member’s location is controlled by their employer 
(please see the diagram below).
Many NGO security focal points recognise the impact 
that gender, ethnicity and nationality can have on an 
individual’s vulnerability and the types of threats that 
the individual faces. There is, however, a failure in 
policies and practices to comprehensively address 
this impact. This is particularly the case when it comes 
to the security concerns and needs of aid workers 
with minority profiles within their organisations, for 
example, those of minority ethnicities (which can 
change depending on the office location), minority 
SOGIE, and those living with a disability. 
A large number of EISF members and other security 
experts who have actively engaged with this project 
recognise that there is an issue around managing 
the safety and security of staff with minority profiles. 
However, many struggle to know where to start. 
A predominant criticism of this research has been that 
diversity is not relevant to security risk management. 
Another criticism is that NGO security focal points are 
already considering the security of staff with different 
profiles on a case-by-case basis, and therefore the 
systematic implementation of an inclusive security risk 
Why diversity matters in 
security risk management1
Individual
(Intersectional  
identity)
Role and  
organisation
RISK
ContextEmployer’s duty  
of care towards 
international  
and relocated  
national staff
Employer’s  
duty of care 
towards  
all staff
23  In this paper, ‘relocated staff’ refers to employees who are based or travelling in an area that is not their home and who are doing so at the request of the organisation.
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management system is unnecessary, and complicates 
a straightforward issue. However, this has not been 
reflected in the findings of this research and the 
experiences shared by individuals with a minority profile.
‘I have worked in the sector for more than 20 years 
and have sat through countless security briefings 
and looked at more security plans than I can list, and 
at no point have the specific risks to my profile been 
identified. I often conduct my own search for security 
information online, or reach out to people I know who 
have worked in that context before.’
Security consultant, UK
The number of responses received for this paper 
from individuals who identify as part of a minority 
profile - including the content of those responses and 
other evidence gathered - undermine assumptions 
that personal profiles should not be systematically 
considered within security risk management systems.
While there are instances where aid workers have 
felt their personal profile well cared for, this appears 
to have been reliant upon staff attitudes rather than 
supportive systems. Other informants cite a ‘don’t ask, 
don’t tell’ approach within their organisations.
Only 21% of survey respondents agreed that their 
organisation had a coherent security strategy for staff 
with minority profiles. Where equality, diversity and 
inclusion policies or non-discrimination and anti-
harassment policies do exist, they are more likely to 
be externally facing and focused on beneficiaries, 
than internal policies that apply to staff. When it comes 
to policy content, only 13% of survey respondents 
reported that their organisation’s security policy made 
explicit reference to different profiles of aid workers.
Some aid workers interviewed as part of this paper 
believe that too much concern with the potential 
security risks of their profile may cause them to be 
blacklisted from certain jobs and may have a negative 
effect on their career. They describe feeling unable to 
voice security concerns in relation to their personal 
profile for fear of discrimination, and often seek advice 
and support outside of the formal security support 
structure of their organisation - and often outside of their 
organisation altogether - to understand the risks they 
may face and ways in which to mitigate against these.
This remains a widely reported phenomenon for any 
aspect of an aid worker’s profile that can be ‘hidden’. 
79% of aid workers surveyed who identified as LGBTQI 
reported concealing this aspect of their profile because 
they feared being discriminated against when it 
came to international deployment opportunities. One 
bisexual aid worker also explained how they had been 
told by a security focal point that hiding their profile 
should not be a problem because they could choose to 
be heterosexual if they wanted. 
‘I’ve been working in this sector for more than 15 years 
and in that time I can honestly say that I have never come 
across a policy that mentions my profile. We just seem 
to operate a bit like the military on a “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” approach – which is funny, because even the US 
military are now more progressive in their approach!’
Mental health aid worker, INGO, Nigeria
While some staff with minority profiles report that 
‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ provides them the cover they 
need to continue doing their job, they also explain 
how concealing an aspect of their profile adds to the 
psychological and emotional stress of their work. These 
stress factors include the fear of discovery, lack of 
recourse when facing discrimination, and consistently 
having to lie or obscure the truth from colleagues.
‘I work for a development organisation and there is 
a line in our security policy that states that everyone 
who goes on an overseas deployment must be able 
to drive a car. As someone who is partially sighted, 
this effectively excludes me from these opportunities. 
There is a little bit of me that feels like this might be 
discrimination, but I don’t want to make a big deal of it 
in case it backfires, so I stay quiet.’
Aid worker, INGO, USA
The absence of a sector-wide approach to inclusive 
security risk management has led to enormous 
differences in attitudes and approaches to diversity 
in aid worker profiles, with serious implications for 
organisational reputations and the security of staff. 
Aid workers regularly move between national and 
international posts and organisations, navigating 
differing security risk management methodologies and 
protocols, as well as fluctuating management attitudes 
towards security and staff personal profiles.
This inevitably leads to the drawing of comparisons 
between organisations which are shared privately 
between friends and colleagues, and publicly on 
forums, thereby cementing organisational reputations 
in the process. Organisations failing to protect staff from 
harassment or perceived internal and external threats 
based on staff personal profiles are increasingly facing 
legal challenges, or having to deal with the effects of 
high staff turnover, including the loss of expertise and 
the failure to recruit diverse and experienced staff. 
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On the other hand, when aid workers navigate such 
different approaches to diversity and security risk 
management, the risks to their security can increase. 
Interactions between aid workers in professional and 
social spaces within operating contexts can make it 
difficult to manage the security of aid workers with 
profiles that may be particularly vulnerable in the 
operational context. Aid workers risk harassment, 
attacks, arrest, and in extreme cases even death, if 
their personal profile is not properly considered as part 
of the organisation’s security risk management in the 
context. This is particularly the case in the digital age 
where online identities can be accessed globally.24
The language and behaviour of staff may also reflect 
on the reputation of the organisation as a whole with 
implications for the security of minority profiles - for 
example, staff members of the same sex who share 
a hotel room to save money may unwittingly cause 
themselves and fellow staff members to be perceived 
as gay, with potential security implications.
National staff should also be considered in relation to 
diversity in risk profiles. National staff are often more 
vulnerable to certain threats, such as bullying and 
blackmail, if individual characteristics become known 
within a conservative culture. However, if security plans 
become too generic, perhaps to avoid the perception 
of discrimination, national staff may assume that 
the security plans do not apply to them and are for 
international staff only. 
National staff may be even more wary of disclosing 
hidden characteristics due to the heightened risks they 
face from their home communities, in comparison to 
what is accepted behaviour from foreigners. In these 
circumstances, a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach might 
be the most effective risk management strategy in 
specific situations, but it must be considered as part 
of a range of approaches and applied only if analysis 
deems it to be the most appropriate response, rather 
than for it to be assumed as the default position by  
the organisation.
The primary benefits to systematically addressing staff 
diversity in security risk management systems are 
twofold. Firstly, staff, whatever their personal profile, 
will have greater security; and secondly, organisations 
will be fulfilling their duty of care obligations. Further 
benefits are highlighted in the following table.
Area of security risk 
management
Benefits of mainstreaming diversity
Governance and 
accountability:
Stronger reputation at a global level on staff care and minority profile issues.
Policy and principles:
Greater knowledge and transparency on decision-making related to staff 
personal profiles, allowing greater certainty on anti-discrimination versus duty of 
care decisions. 
Operations and 
programmes:
A more diverse workforce that is better positioned to meet the needs of diverse 
beneficiaries. An expanded pool of recruits to find the best person for the job. 
Greater staff retention.
Travel management 
and support:
More staff able to travel, as well as safer travel for all staff members. Lower risk 
of unexpected threats emerging due to personal profiles and therefore greater 
ability to respond to these threats.
Awareness and 
capacity building:
Improved staff capacity, competence and retention. Fewer security incidents 
and reduced impact of incidents that do occur. Greater staff confidence in the 
organisation supporting overall wellbeing.
Incident monitoring:
Better understanding of the nature and types of threats the organisation and 
staff are vulnerable to, and how to avoid security incidents.
Crisis management: Better support for all staff members who experience security incidents.
Networks and 
collaboration:
Increased learning due to the inclusion of diverse voices and experiences.
24  Kumar (2017).
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Aid workers’ personal risk profiles are not equal from 
the outset, and aid organisations should therefore aim 
to ensure that the security risk management structure 
in place recognises this diversity and results in an 
equal level of acceptable risk for all staff, no matter 
what their personal profile is.
The systematic inclusion of diversity considerations 
in security risk management systems presents 
numerous benefits, as highlighted above, but also 
challenges. Principle among these is whether making 
security decisions which disproportionately affect 
specific profiles may be considered discriminatory 
and breaching anti-discrimination legislation. This key 
challenge and others identified as part of the research 
are unpacked further in the following two sections of 
the paper. 
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One of the principal challenges identified as part of 
this research is the lack of understanding among 
decision-makers as to what personal information can 
be asked of individuals, and then how this information 
can be used to inform security decisions, particularly 
if the resulting decision is one that may be deemed 
discriminatory against certain profiles.
In order to analyse this dilemma it is important to better 
understand the two overarching legal and ethical 
obligations that come into play in this discussion:
•  Duty of care
•  Anti-discrimination
2.1. Overview
Legal duty of care is an ‘obligation imposed on an 
individual or organisation by law requiring that they 
adhere to a standard of reasonable care while 
performing acts (or omissions) that present a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of harm to themselves or others.’25
Duty of care has both a legal and an ethical 
dimension. The difference between the two varies 
across jurisdictions and the ethics of the society and 
organisation in question. For the scope of this research, 
this paper takes the broadest perspective on duty 
of care, which goes beyond legal obligations and 
includes ethical considerations, particularly around 
staff wellbeing. It is important to note that, depending 
on the applicable jurisdiction, non-employees may 
also be owed a duty of care by the organisation – for 
example, volunteers and consultants.
Discrimination is the unfair or unequal treatment 
of an individual (or group) due to their personal 
characteristics, which the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1952) identifies as: ‘sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.’
Discrimination can be direct – that is, ‘where one 
person is treated less favourably than another is, has 
been or would be treated in a comparable situation, 
on any of the grounds’ of disability, age, religion, belief, 
or sexual orientation’.26
Discrimination can also be indirect27, where ‘an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would 
put persons having a particular religion or belief, a 
particular disability, a particular age, or a particular 
sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage 
compared with other persons.’28
Anti-discrimination law involves two primary actions on 
behalf of an employer:
•  To not engage in unjustified discrimination. This 
means refraining from decisions or policies and 
practices that would be discriminatory, as well as 
actively removing, reducing or preventing obstacles 
that prevent individuals from enjoying their rights 
and freedoms (particularly in relation to disability).29
•  To protect its staff from discrimination and 
harassment and to take actions that address 
infractions, including setting up safe reporting 
mechanisms and disciplinary procedures.
Data protection legislation at national and European 
Union (EU) levels furthermore protects individuals from 
having to disclose information that relates to their 
personal characteristics unless they wish to do so.
2.2. Can discrimination be justified?
Anti-discrimination laws vary from country to country 
but the European Union has issued directives that 
prohibit direct and indirect discrimination, victimisation, 
harassment and instructions to discriminate. These 
directives must be reflected in national legislation 
of European Union member states. Of particular 
relevance is the employment equality directive 
(2000/78/EC), which this paper reflects on specifically.
Legal duty of care and  
anti-discrimination2
25  Kemp & Merkelbach (2016).
26  The Council of the European Union (2000).
27  In the United Kingdom, for example, see more information on indirect discrimination in section 19 of the UK Equality Act 2010.
28  The Council of the European Union (2000).
29  More information on disability-related discrimination under UK legislation can be found in section 15 of the UK Equality Act 2010.
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Harassment and victimisation are never defensible. 
The employment equality directive furthermore states 
that direct discrimination can never be justified. The 
only way that organisations can prevent accusations 
of direct discrimination is to have transparent rules, 
policies and practices that are sensitive to all profiles. 
Failure to account for diversity in profiles in this way 
- whether in recruitment, everyday employment or 
deployment - increases the vulnerability of individual 
staff and organisations to reputational and legal risks.
However, indirect discrimination can be justified if the 
relevant ‘provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.’30 
The discriminatory action must also be proportionate.31
There are circumstances in which there may be 
exceptions if necessary ‘for the maintenance of public 
order and the prevention of criminal offences, for the 
protection of health and for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.’32 The directive also states that 
an exception can occur where a particular profile is 
actively sought over others for a particular role, if ‘the 
nature of the particular occupational activities concerned 
or of the context in which they are carried out, such a 
characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, provided that the objective  
is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate.’33
More nuanced provisions are in place for age and 
disability.
Similarly, the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) imposes restrictions on the processing 
of sensitive personal data, which means that an 
individual’s race or ethnic origin, sexual orientation, 
and information concerning their health can only be 
processed with the explicit consent of the individual.34 
This means that unless an individual shares 
information in relation to their disability, SOGIE and/or 
ethnicity or race, employers have no right to demand 
this information. That said, there is no restriction on 
requesting this information so long as the decision of 
sharing this information rests with the individual and 
the individual is aware that sharing the information 
is optional. If information is shared, it must be treated 
with the utmost confidentiality.
Example
A security risk assessment carried out by security experts of an organisation determines that individuals of 
a particular ethnic origin (X ethnicity) face an extremely high risk of attack compared to other ethnicities in a 
particular operational location. The organisation operating in this area wishes to recruit someone to live and 
work in this location but does not wish to put anyone at unnecessary additional risk.
Option 1: The organisation’s job advertisement references this additional risk stating ‘due to assessed security 
risks, this position is not open to individuals of X ethnicity.’ This statement is clearly reflected in risk assessment 
documentation and security plans.
Option 2: The job advertisement has no information on the security risks faced by the particular ethnicity. During 
the recruitment process, the organisation tells one candidate of X ethnicity that they are unable to employ them 
due to the security situation in the country. 
Option 1 would be a form of indirect discrimination, which can be justified, as it clearly applies to all individuals of 
ethnicity X, and this blanket application is well-documented.
Option 2 would be a form of direct discrimination, which cannot be justified, as it has been applied to one 
particular individual rather than transparently demonstrating that the decision is being applied to all individuals 
of ethnicity X.
It is important to note, however, that even for Option 1, it is extremely important that every step is taken to ensure 
that discrimination is the last resort and objectively justified to meet a legitimate aim, e.g. safeguarding an 
individual’s wellbeing in the face of a well-evidenced high risk of danger.
30  The Council of the European Union (2000).
31  For more information on enquiries about disability and health in the UK context, please see section 60 of the UK Equality Act 2010. 
32  The Council of the European Union (2000).
33  ibid
34  European Union (2016).
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‘There is this [misperception] that it is illegal to ask 
for information about people’s individual profile. This 
is not true. You absolutely can ask, and in fact you 
probably can’t fulfil your duty of care unless you do 
ask. There are two issues associated with this that are 
central to the processes within our organisation: the 
first is that we provide opportunities for staff to refuse 
to tell us (e.g. tick a box that says, prefer not to say) 
about their personal identity. The second is that we 
have established transparent and secure approaches 
to gathering data and associated data protection.’
Head of operations, INGO, UK
It is conceivable that in given circumstances, duty of 
care obligations could compel decision-makers within 
organisations to ask personal profile questions, which 
staff may refuse to answer, and to make decisions 
that discriminate based on personal profiles if done 
transparently, systematically, proportionately, and on 
the basis of sound security information in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim.
It is important that every organisation seeks legal 
advice prior to making decisions that may be deemed 
discriminatory, and considers the legal framework that 
applies in the relevant country. Organisations must 
consider that due to the cross-border nature of their 
work, they may be subject to multiple legal frameworks. 
There may well be times, particularly in high or 
extreme risk situations, when certain profiles are 
required to follow rules, policies or practices that set 
them apart from others in order to keep them safe. 
The question here is whether the actions on the part 
of the organisation are proportionate to the risk and 
whether or not it is possible to take less or completely 
non-discriminatory alternative actions. All actions 
must be based on documented evidence and not on 
assumptions and perceptions. 
On occasions where the profile of the individual is 
known or where certain profile types are known to be at 
greater risk, and something happens to a staff member 
as a result of this, the failure to consider personal profiles 
can equally bring an aid organisation before a court of 
law for failing to meet duty of care obligations.
Safeguards, however, should be put in place to 
protect staff from discrimination under the guise of 
security. The following quote illustrates an example 
of a discriminatory decision made in the interests of 
staff security but with no clear evidence to suggest the 
decision was well-founded, legitimate or proportionate.
‘In the north part of Mali, we are all aware that at 
some point we may need to withdraw all woman [sic] 
and replace them with men. An American expat then 
accused me of discriminating against women. That’s 
stupid. It’s for security. “No women” policy is a way to 
protect women.’
Security manager, INGO, Mali
The default position from the aid organisation in all 
circumstances should be to enable all staff, regardless of 
their profile, to carry out the work they are qualified and 
employed to do. Good practice suggests consulting with 
the affected staff member to discuss security concerns 
and reasonable solutions to mitigate identified risk.
There is nonetheless a very real concern voiced by 
contributors to this research, that if aid workers share 
information about their personal profile, particularly 
if it relates to a hidden characteristic, this may lead to 
them being removed from certain jobs, which may 
subsequently affect their future career progression. 
This is a particular challenge for security focal points 
who may themselves have minority profiles that are 
at particular risk in given contexts, while the nature 
of their job requires them to travel to these places to 
obtain first-hand experience of the risks faced in this 
operational context.
‘I have been working as a security consultant for 
a number of years and although I am gay this is 
not something I have ever felt able to disclose to 
colleagues. As a security consultant who regularly 
works in high risk contexts, I don’t believe I would be 
employed by future employers if I was to be asked to 
disclose my sexuality. It puts me in a bit of a difficult 
situation, because I am often advocating to security 
managers that they should be more sensitive to the 
individual needs of different staff members and at  
the same time I feel the impossibility of being ‘out’  
in my current role.’
Security consultant
Training staff on duty of care and anti-discrimination 
obligations, as well as organisational policy in relation 
to diversity and security risk management, is a key 
step in ensuring that decisions made to improve 
security are reasonable without being unilateral and 
unjustifiably discriminatory. All security decisions must 
be proportionate to the risk.
For organisations working across different contexts, 
there are principles and standards that can be drawn 
from to support their understanding of the balance 
between duty of care obligations and the rights of 
individuals not to be discriminated against.
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2.3. What does this mean for aid 
organisations?
‘I would be very concerned if an organisation took  
the decision not to send me on a posting because  
of my profile. I don’t think this is a decision the 
organisation can make without me. If it’s because of 
my gender or a disability or whatever, we must ask 
what activities may be illegal or constitute a security 
risk and whether we can mitigate them rather than  
a wholesale ban on certain people working in that 
context. The more difficult question is how do we  
have these conversations in training? How do we 
make these conversations possible while also 
respecting confidentiality?’
Mental health officer, INGO, USA
The interaction between duty of care obligations 
and anti-discrimination legislation carries with it the 
obligation on organisations to acknowledge that in 
order to meet their duty of care, decision-makers 
must: firstly, understand the diverse personal profiles 
of staff to the greatest extent possible; secondly, put 
in place measures to protect staff on the basis of this 
knowledge and risks identified; and thirdly, consider, 
only as a last resort, any actions that may indirectly 
discriminate on the basis of personal profiles in order 
to keep staff safe. This paper labels this process 
‘inclusive security risk management’.
As well as balancing issues of direct and indirect 
discrimination with duty of care, NGOs have a specific 
responsibility to make reasonable adjustments for 
aid workers with disabilities.37 Key to the issue of 
reasonable adjustment is whether an organisation 
has taken steps to remove, reduce or prevent the 
obstacles faced by a member of staff or job applicant 
with a disability. A reasonable adjustment approach, 
although drawn from obligations around supporting 
staff with disabilities, can equally be a helpful lens 
through which to view supporting staff of all profiles.
To appropriately consider how staff profiles affect risk 
and what reasonable adjustments should be put in 
place, a risk assessment of the role must be carried 
out prior to recruitment, and the type of information 
covered during the security components of trainings, 
inductions and in-country briefings must be carefully 
considered. Reasonable adjustments should also be 
considered as part of context analyses, country security 
planning, incident reporting, and measures to keep 
staff updated on security threats.
‘Often in humanitarian crisis situations, we need to  
act quickly and to get people on the ground quickly. 
In this case, it might not be possible for us to meet the 
needs of someone with a physical disability. It isn’t our 
priority in that particular moment. Does that make us  
a bad employer?’
Security manager, INGO, Germany
Human rights 
instruments
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
Sector standards
Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
Sphere: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian 
Response
ICRC Code of Conduct
Most organisations will also have their own code of conduct and other 
documents, which focus on equality, diversity and inclusion.
European Union
European Convention on Human Rights
The European Union Employment Equality Directive (2000/78/EC)
The Employment Equality Directive – European Implementation Assessment35
Other EU legislation36
35  Please see: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536346/EPRS_STU(2016)536346_EN.pdf 
36  Please see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/employment_and_social_policy/1713.html?root=1713 
37  For more information on the duty to make reasonable adjustments under UK legislation, please see sections 20, 21, and 39 of the UK Equality Act 2010.
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An aid worker’s personal profile:
•  should not hinder their promotion if they are the  
best person for the job with reasonable adjustments 
in place
•  must not be a reason to dismiss the aid worker
•  must be considered in relation to every aspect of 
an aid worker’s job, including living conditions for 
international and relocated staff.
What is ‘reasonable’ for one organisation may be 
different for another organisation and will vary 
depending on the context. Contributing factors may 
include the size, financial assets and nature of the 
organisation and the specific role in question. Issues of 
security may also affect what is reasonable. 
A key step in meeting both duty of care and anti-
discrimination responsibilities is for organisations to 
understand the impact that individual staff personal 
profiles can have on the threats they face and 
their individual vulnerabilities in any given context. 
Organisational policies can then be developed to 
support staff in understanding the principles that 
should guide them in balancing these, sometimes 
contradictory, responsibilities.
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Comprehensive risk assessments involve the analysis 
of threats and vulnerability within the operating 
environment. Most NGOs conduct risk assessments 
that assess external threats and their impact on 
organisation-wide vulnerability. The research found 
that general approaches to risk assessment often fall 
short when it comes to considering:
•  internal threats to international and national staff 
from colleagues, particularly when these relate to 
personal profiles; and
•  the types and impact of external threats (i.e. 
those from individuals or groups outside of the 
organisation) on international and national 
staff whose personal profiles may make them 
particularly vulnerable in a specific context.
Legal duty of care obligations require NGOs to 
safeguard staff from foreseeable risks. This involves, 
among other measures, obtaining informed consent 
from all employees. Informed consent involves 
briefing all staff on threats, mitigation procedures and 
contingency plans if things go wrong, as well as their 
own responsibilities.
Despite this obligation, aid workers with minority 
profiles reported during the research that they sought 
information about security risks to their profile from 
informal sources because, from their experience, 
organisations failed to provide this information. 
Young and early-career aid workers end up 
being particularly at risk if organisations fail in this 
regard because of their lack of previous contextual 
knowledge and experience, as well as their potential 
overreliance on the security information provided by 
their employing organisations. 
In order to adequately brief staff and meet the 
informed consent component of duty of care 
responsibilities, an employer must understand and be 
able to share information on risks against particular 
profiles. This information needs to be shared with 
all staff and not just specifically target staff that have 
identified themselves with a particular profile, as some 
aid workers may fear disclosing characteristics, while 
other colleagues would benefit from understanding the 
risks faced by their colleagues and how their behaviour 
may be perceived and/or impact them.
Survey responses (see figure 6) indicate that diverse 
profiles are not necessarily accounted for during risk 
assessments, though these assessments should 
provide the ideal opportunity to systematically 
understand what risks particular identity profiles may 
be subjected to.
3.1. Internal threats
Aid workers who contributed to this research and 
identified as LGBTQI or as a person with a disability 
reported feeling more concerned about internal threats 
than external threats to their security. In contrast, 
threats on the basis of ethnicity were perceived as 
more likely to be from outside of the organisation.
Understanding diversity  
in risk3
Fig 6: Survey responses
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An intersectional identity approach to risk assessments 
allows security focal points to also understand how 
power dynamics change in relation to a staff member’s 
personal identity and organisational role, and the risks 
they may face as a result. This is particularly important 
to understand why some staff may have a heightened 
risk of experiencing internal threats due to their 
personal profile.
Although the potential impact of external threats 
is high, internal threats deserve significantly more 
consideration than they currently receive. A study by 
the Feinstein Centre revealed that male and female 
LGBTQI aid workers posted abroad experience 
blackmail, harassment and even so-called ‘corrective 
rape’ by colleagues.38 Report the Abuse conducted 
a survey that found that out of 1,000 aid worker 
respondents, 72% were survivors of sexual violence, 
and in 64% of the reported cases, the perpetrator 
was a colleague of the survivor.39 This data, and the 
emergence of allegations of sexual misconduct within 
the aid sector as part of the #AidToo movement, 
suggests that these internal threats have been an 
open secret within the sector for many years, but have 
not been comprehensively addressed by security 
risk management systems, safeguarding measures, 
reporting mechanisms, and code of conduct training. 
Although the impact of internal threats might, initially, 
be less damaging to the organisation, to the individual 
they can be devastating, often making the working 
environment untenable. Knock-on effects to the 
organisation can include poor staff retention and 
reputational damage.
Discrimination, harassment, victimisation and violence 
inflicted by aid workers on other aid workers differ 
in impact and likelihood depending on the personal 
profile of the aid worker and may arise independently 
of the external threat context (although certain external 
elements may influence threats, e.g. by creating an 
enabling environment).
Staff who identify as LGBTQI, as having a disability, 
and across a range of ethnicities, report that they 
have felt the need to conceal these aspects of their 
identity in their job. LGBTQI staff working in faith-
based organisations consistently report that they fear 
being open about their sexuality to national and 
international colleagues.
‘At my organisation we always have a morning 
devotional. As a Christian, this is something I deeply 
value. However, on a number of occasions in 
devotionals, colleagues have insisted on highlighting 
passages in the Bible that speak about homosexuality 
as a sin. On at least two occasions this spiralled into 
a hate-filled rhetoric about gay people. As a gay man 
I am constantly reminded why I have to keep my 
sexuality a secret.’
Aid worker, Faith-based NGO, Middle East
Due to the lack of robust security risk management  
of internal threats, discrimination and harassment  
is under-reported by aid workers because, according 
to contributors to the research, organisations do 
not have adequate policies and processes in place, 
particularly when the threat relates to personal profiles, 
and the organisational culture is not perceived as 
equal or inclusive. 
It is important to note that internal threats are often 
considered to be the responsibility of HR. When internal 
threats are reported and treated through HR, the 
incidents often do not make it into the security incident 
reporting mechanisms and therefore do not appear 
within the reporting systems that enable managers to 
understand the risks staff face and ensure appropriate 
treatment measures are put in place. Furthermore, 
key informants reported believing that HR staff lack the 
knowledge on how to effectively implement and support 
these types of processes even when they do exist.
Because of inconsistent approaches to, and reporting 
systems for, internal threats, many perpetrators of 
violence, harassment and victimisation are seen to 
be going unpunished and continue to work within 
the sector, while victims and survivors lack support to 
speak out, report and seek justice. 
Individual
(Intersectional  
identity)
Role and  
organisation
RISK
Context
Internal  
threats
38  Mazurana & Donnelly (2017).
39  Nobert (2017).
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When cases are actually investigated, non-disclosure 
agreements can mean that neither survivors nor other 
staff in the organisation can speak out about the 
incident or the perpetrator. This has the effect that the 
survivor may feel they have done something wrong 
and are not allowed to discuss what has happened  
to them – even when they want to.
Internal threats during in-country travel are a 
particularly grave concern, especially the further that 
staff travel or are based from the country office. While 
standard operating procedures for in-country travel are 
likely to cover responses to external threats, internal 
threats often remain unaccounted for. Inexperienced 
and junior staff are particularly vulnerable when away 
from other colleagues if the perpetrators are more 
senior or where there is a power imbalance.
This relates to a bigger problem of staff conduct on 
deployment and a prevailing sense that they are 
further from the disciplinary mechanisms of 
headquarters. This may be the result of local culture  
or legal structures, which can reinforce staff 
misconduct against particular staff profiles. Although 
this should not be an excuse, it evidences the 
difficulties organisations face when coordinating 
anti-discrimination and anti-harassment principles 
across different legal and cultural contexts.
3.2. External threats
Threats from external sources (e.g. legal, cultural, 
natural hazards, or conflict) may differ in nature,  
impact and likelihood depending on the profile of the 
aid worker, pointing to the importance of differentiated 
risk assessments, security training, and standard 
operating procedures, as well as incident and crisis 
response strategies for particularly vulnerable profiles 
in given contexts.
The research has found that security incidents can 
be motivated by staff profiles, in particular gender 
and ethnicity as perceived by others. Data from the 
Aid in Danger project by Insecurity Insight identified 
four incidents between January 2017 and March 2018 
where an aid worker’s personal profile was the primary 
motive for the incident taking place. These four events 
occurred in DRC, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Syria. Most 
were related to the aid workers’ ethnicities.40 Due to 
underreporting, this data is likely only the tip of the 
iceberg, and efforts are needed to improve reporting 
on incidents of this nature to help inform security 
briefings, risk assessments and security plans. 
The Aid Worker Security Database41, which is run by 
Humanitarian Outcomes and records major incidents 
affecting aid workers, disaggregates victim data by 
sex, organisation type, and whether victims were 
national or international staff, but includes no other 
identity categories. This is due to the fact that aid 
organisations that share their data with Humanitarian 
Outcomes do not currently collect further information 
on the personal characteristics of victims in their 
security incident reports.
It is important to remember intersectionality in incident 
reporting: that is, when considering individual profiles, 
all aspects of their identity must be considered. For 
example, two women who share the same age, 
nationality and SOGIE may have different vulnerabilities 
because of their ethnicity.42
  See Annex 1 for a breakdown of possible external 
threats to consider against minority profiles.
Fig 7: Survey responses
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40  See Insecurity Insight (2018) for further details.
41  See the Aid Worker Security Database here: https://aidworkersecurity.org/ 
42  For particular information on threats against LGBTQI individuals see: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/06/23/human-rights-watch-country-profiles-sexual-orientation-and-gender-identity and  
http://ilga.org/maps-sexual-orientation-laws and https://www.stonewall.org.uk/global-workplace-briefings
Managing the Security of Aid Workers with Diverse Profiles26
4.1. International policies versus local 
laws and norms
Decision-makers in organisations reached through this 
research have voiced uncertainty on how to develop 
policies sensitive to both international and national 
norms and values. The contributors to the research 
demonstrated a divergence in opinion about the degree 
to which aid workers should be expected to live within 
the norms, laws and values of the operating context. 
Overall, 62% of survey respondents agreed with the 
statement that aid workers should be expected to live 
within the norms, laws and values of the context in 
which they are deployed. 21% of survey respondents 
reported being uncertain about whether they should 
be expected to change their behaviour, while 17% 
refuted this idea entirely. 
These differences in attitudes reflect the difficulties 
of navigating very different norms and behaviours 
towards aid workers with minority profiles. This is a 
particular issue for aid workers who identify as LGBTQI 
given that Western attitudes towards their SOGIE may 
diverge quite drastically from the attitudes prevalent in 
many of the countries in which aid organisations tend 
to operate.
‘I have been deployed to locations where being 
a gay man was not necessarily illegal, but it was 
the workplace culture in that location that made it 
impossible for me to feel safe being “out”. I felt so 
isolated in these posts because it often feels like too 
much effort to socialise with your colleagues because 
you end up lying to them about who you are or biting 
your tongue when they say something hateful or 
discriminatory without realising they are trash-talking 
me too. So, I ended up being quite withdrawn and that 
had a massive impact on my mental health.’
Security advisor, INGO, USA
Where uncertainty exists about whether to follow 
national or international law in policy, some 
organisations have turned to a zero tolerance security 
approach to try and police the behaviour of all staff, 
whatever their personal profile. One commonly cited 
example is when organisations adopt a zero tolerance 
approach to the use of dating apps. For LGBTQI aid 
workers, this restriction was reported through the 
research as limiting opportunities for social interaction 
during deployments, especially where it may be 
dangerous for LGBTQI staff to be open about their 
SOGIE with colleagues. 
‘A lot of the advice around using dating apps when 
travelling is simply - don’t do it. But the problem is 
that people do use them, and it is such a hard policy 
to police -whether you’re gay or straight [etc.]. I think 
that being gay and not being out and not being able 
to even have the potential of meeting someone - and 
I’m talking about long term postings here of a year 
or more - means you are more likely to put yourself 
in risky situations. And then, if something bad does 
happen, because of this zero tolerance approach, it 
makes it impossible to report and to seek help.’
Security director, INGO, Lebanon
Understanding the problem: 
key challenges and findings4
Fig 8: Survey responses
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Aid workers reportedly still do use dating apps 
but given organisational policy on this issue, and 
additional fear about disclosing their SOGIE to 
colleagues, this has resulted in LGBTQI aid workers 
feeling that it is impossible to report and seek help if 
they find themselves in a security situation because 
of using a dating app.43 Some organisations have 
implemented an ‘amnesty policy’ so staff know there 
will be no disciplinary action taken against them if 
they report an incident that occurred while they were 
breaking rules.
The challenges become more poignant when 
laws, norms and values of an operating context 
may be seen to contravene the human rights of aid 
workers, when they come into conflict with the legal 
frameworks of an organisation’s HQ or an international 
aid worker’s home context. This may arise for minority 
as well as majority profiles related to SOGIE, religion, 
race and ethnicity.
Contributors to this research explained that these 
issues usually come to a head when trying to 
institutionalise expectations of aid workers in codes 
of conduct, and enforcing disciplinary procedures 
when aid workers fail to uphold these standards in 
the country programmes due to a clash between the 
organisation’s policies and local laws and norms.
The following principles may be useful for organisations 
wishing to develop or review their code of conduct to 
make it more inclusive of diverse staff profiles:
•  Aid workers have a responsibility to keep 
themselves and their colleagues safe while 
carrying out operations and programmes.
•  International human rights instruments can 
provide a useful starting point for developing a 
code of conduct.
•  Codes of conduct should be based on 
principles of non-discrimination and sustaining 
a safe working environment for all.
•  HR, security focal points, senior leaders and 
aid workers from a diverse range of personal 
profiles should be included in the development 
and review of codes of conduct.
•  International and national staff should be held 
accountable to the code of conduct, irrespective 
of their position within the organisation.
•  Codes of conduct should be translated into 
operational languages.  
•  Consequences for not upholding codes of 
conduct must be made explicit and consistently 
enforced by line managers and HR.
‘We recently had a situation in our Pakistan 
office, which is almost entirely staffed by national 
staff members. We found out that a member of 
national staff was being harassed for being gay 
by a member of his team. Being gay is still illegal 
in Pakistan, but it is largely unenforced. However, 
talking about sexual orientation remains a taboo 
topic even in Islamabad where our main office 
is based. As a security manager I was really 
concerned about the security of this staff member, 
particularly as I knew he would often go to more 
remote parts of the country where being gay was 
more of an issue. But, I felt initially like my hands 
were tied due to the national laws and norms.
In the end, I decided to speak to the line manager 
of the people involved – both the harassers and 
the man being harassed. During that conversation, 
rather than try to say that their feelings about 
homosexuality were wrong, I tried to convey my 
concerns about the security of the team – what 
might happen to this colleague and the programme 
if the ‘wrong people’ were to find out he was gay? 
This led into a productive conversation about our 
code of conduct and how this meant that all staff 
had a right to be free from discrimination at work.  
At the end of the conversation, it was the line 
manager who tackled the issue with her team 
based on the principle that we may all hold 
different beliefs but that we were all working 
towards a shared goal. We came to the decision 
that while we work towards that goal we may not 
understand or even like the different profiles of 
our colleagues but that this was not grounds for 
disrespect and discrimination.’
Case Study – Pakistan
43  Kumar (2017).
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‘Something we haven’t yet managed to adequately 
tackle is to give our staff the trust they need in order 
to report issues. Even though we have policies, I don’t 
feel that we have communicated clearly enough the 
procedures for this, and this becomes particularly 
complicated by having country offices with different 
perspectives on what counts as discrimination and 
therefore a legitimate security incident. What I will say 
is that it is important for us not to stand in judgement 
of our country offices, but to understand what their 
concerns are and to work with them.’
Security director, INGO, USA
Organisations entering into partnership agreements 
with local organisations may find an even greater clash 
between local norms and international policies. Open 
and honest discussions about how local partners 
intend to manage the security of aid workers while 
being mindful of their diversity may be a good starting 
point. As well as security risk assessment processes 
and mitigation measures, these discussions should 
also cover incident reporting, crisis management, and 
data sharing and protection principles.
To further support a joined-up approach towards 
inclusive security risk management in partnerships, 
organisations might consider signing a shared equality, 
diversity and inclusion policy44 that underscores a 
commitment to the non-discrimination and security of all 
aid workers irrespective of their profile. 
  See Section 2. Legal duty of care and  
anti-discrimination.
4.2. Organisational culture
Organisational culture and attitudes towards particular 
profiles play a role in how inclusive human resources 
and security risk management processes can be. For 
example, key informants highlighted the dilemmas 
faced by LGBTQI aid workers working within faith-based 
organisations, where strong internal pressure from 
colleagues and external pressure from donors and 
partners, can play a role in how pro-LGBTQI organisations 
want to be, or feel they can be, towards staff.
‘We are concerned that we will lose funding for our 
programmes if we are too pro-LGBTQI. Particularly 
if the churches, which raise the donations, get wind 
that they might be donating to an organisation with 
a soft approach to homosexuality. At the moment in 
the US with the current backlash against DOMA45 and 
more liberal progressive policies, we are seeing the 
churches use their power, via donations, to influence 
us and our partner organisations.’
Aid worker, Faith-based NGO, DRC
Many faith-based organisations can struggle to make 
open statements about being equal opportunity 
employers due to beliefs, from staff as well as church 
donors, about the marital status, sexuality and religion 
of staff. On 24 March 2014, the CEO of World Vision 
USA announced that they would hire gay Christians in 
same-sex marriages. However, two days later, and as 
the result of intense financial pressure from funders, 
this decision was reversed.46
‘As an organisation we’re keen to employ people 
from a diverse range of backgrounds. This includes 
sexuality, gender, and ethnicity. However, I have a 
number of colleagues who hold what I would consider 
very conservative views. These different views are 
valued in our organisation but at the same time when 
people are openly homophobic this seems to be 
allowed if it is in keeping with their religious views. 
There is an assumption that if those views fit with your 
religious belief then that’s okay; it feels like protecting 
people from homophobic abuse is less important than 
upholding religious freedoms.’
Aid worker, INGO, Egypt
‘Our organisation has openly LGBTQI senior 
managers across several countries, who have 
advocated for the inclusion of LGBTQI issues within 
the organisation’s code of conduct. All our staff, 
including local staff, sign up to this code of conduct, 
which has a specific chapter on human rights and 
discrimination. The issue of harassment based 
on sexual orientation is explicitly mentioned. We 
are currently working on organisational policies 
to ensure that issues of harassment of LGBTQI 
staff members, including the use of inappropriate 
‘jokes’ and comments, are not accepted within 
the organisation. Although we do work within the 
laws of the countries within which we work, we 
are clear that we have a zero tolerance approach 
to harassment within our organisation.’
Case Study – Global
44  See an example equality, diversity and inclusion policy from British Council (2018).
45  Known as the Defense of Marriage Act. See GLAAD (2018).
46  Phillips (2017). 
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When organisations have identified particular values or 
accepted funding with specific restrictions, this should 
be clearly part of the staff informed consent process. This 
applies to all aid organisations and not just faith-based 
ones. For example, due to its work on reproductive 
health, Marie Stopes International staff face particular 
risks in conservative contexts. This additional risk should 
be clearly communicated and accepted by staff as part 
of the informed consent process.
There is evidence of positive efforts in this regard.  
ACT Alliance, a coalition of 146 churches and faith-
based organisations is currently working to develop 
security policies and processes that are inclusive of 
minority profiles. In May 2017 they published the ‘ACT 
Gender Security Guidelines: Threats to men, women 
and LGBTI staff’.47
Related to organisational culture is what organisations 
can and should do to create a more tolerant 
environment for particular individuals, for example, 
transgender staff. One HR informant stated, ‘You have 
to worry less about the trans colleague and more 
about making sure that other staff are prepared 
for their arrival’. This is a challenge in liberal and 
conservative environments alike, but good practice 
literature on how to approach this situation is 
growing.48 In-depth conversations with the trans staff 
member and their needs can be a key starting point to 
help guide the integration process, closely followed by 
efforts to engage the office as a whole. If done well, this 
reduces the likelihood of harassment and other forms 
of discrimination from fellow colleagues.
Where organisations fail to create an organisational 
culture that values equality and diversity, incidents of 
harassment are higher. Harassment can easily become 
a more serious security threat to the individual and the 
organisation if it is not handled promptly and sensitively.
It is vital that organisational policies, such as equality 
and diversity, anti-harassment and codes of conduct, 
all mutually reinforce each other to form the basis of 
a culture where aid workers with minority profiles feel 
able to report incidents without fear of reprisal. Faith-
based organisations may have to ask some difficult 
questions about how to balance their values while also 
ensuring the security of all their staff, including those 
who identify as LGBTQI. 
‘A colleague asked to address his team members 
at a team meeting. At this meeting he told his 
colleagues, most of them male and a few of them 
very religious, that he identified as transgender. 
He organised a follow-up meeting for colleagues 
where he discussed what transgender meant, 
why he felt as he did, what he looked like dressed 
as a woman, etc. He invited colleagues to ask him 
questions. This approach was a very open and 
participatory one where he invited colleagues to 
understand the personal journey he was going 
through. Even though there were colleagues who 
didn’t accept his transgender identity as legitimate 
due to their religious beliefs, the approach taken 
allowed them to understand his motivations and 
to accept that this was his choice to make.’
Case Study – UK
The development of an inclusive security risk 
management structure should be complemented by 
efforts to build an overall inclusive culture. 
‘In a lot of countries where we work polio still affects 
large swathes of the population. For them, living with 
a disability does not cause a problem in their everyday 
life because others will help them getting out of the 
car, they are never mocked. It is true that some staff 
are afraid to lose their jobs, and one effect of this is 
that they will do anything to go to work. We find that 
the biggest barrier they face can be the attitudes of 
international staff.’
Security manager, INGO, Mali
Efforts to improve the security of staff with different 
profiles need to complement broader organisational 
efforts that look at culture around diversity, starting with 
staff members as individuals but also in relation to the 
organisation’s own values.
4.3. Recruitment
Failure to understand the vulnerabilities and additional 
risks run by aid workers with certain profiles in 
given contexts prior to recruitment means firstly, that 
incoming staff may not know about these risks until it 
is too late for them to make an informed decision, and 
secondly, that recruiting staff may inadvertently hire the 
wrong person for the role.49
47  Davis, Sheppey, Linderman, & Linde (2017).
48  LGBT Health and Wellbeing and NHS Lothian (2016).
49  While this section refers to new staff, the policies and procedures may be equally applicable to staff already employed by the organisation and who are being deployed in a new setting.  
Considerations around travel and deployment are covered in more detail in Section 5.6.
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‘We recently had a situation where we hired 
a man for a job in Togo. We decided that he 
was the most qualified candidate after quite a 
long interview process, etc. However, after the 
interview, he came to us and he told us that he 
was gay and that he had only just realised that 
same-sex sex in Togo is illegal. As a team we 
didn’t know what to do; we had never knowingly 
deployed an LGBT person to a country where 
it was illegal before. In the end, the candidate 
decided that he did not want to accept the job. On 
the one hand, we were a little bit relieved but on 
the other hand we realised that we did not know 
how to deal with this situation.’
Case Study – Togo
A key challenge is that there are limitations as to what 
an organisation can ask candidates during recruitment 
as well as restrictions on basing recruitment decisions 
on personal profiles. While indirect discrimination can 
be justified, as mentioned previously, this should be a  
last resort.
Good practice in recruitment suggests risk assessing 
the role prior to recruitment, including the information 
gathered in the application process, and then risk 
assessing the final candidate. The recruitment 
team should play an active role in supporting the 
candidate’s informed consent prior to finalising 
recruitment. Organisations can do this by ensuring 
that the security information they provide to 
prospective candidates is up-to-date and includes 
information on the risks that might affect particular 
profiles disproportionately. This information, which 
may form part of the job description, should ideally be 
part of the recruitment package, and should enable 
people to understand the security implications of 
undertaking the role.
Aid workers should also be encouraged to find out 
their own information about the deployment context 
and think carefully about what living and working 
in this context will mean for their personal safety 
and security. This may involve contacting friends 
and colleagues or asking questions on the growing 
number of internet forums for aid workers. Embassy 
websites and advocacy organisations are also useful 
places for up-to-date information on the risks to 
different traveller profiles.
Good practice example
Organisations might consider creating a bank 
of confidential testimonials about working in 
different locations that can be shared with 
potential recruits. This is an approach adopted 
by USAID, among others, and involves a list 
of standardised questions where individuals 
have rated certain aspects of the posting, and 
provided longer answers for greater context. In 
smaller organisations, a more practical approach 
might be to put potential recruits in touch with 
existing members of staff so that they can ask 
specific questions about the role and daily life. 
Confidentiality should be ensured throughout  
this process.
When it comes to basing recruitment decisions on staff 
profiles, evidence gathered from interviews conducted 
for this paper suggests that some aid workers 
experience discrimination when applying for 
international deployment positions. This appears to be 
a particular issue for aid workers with mobility 
impairments. This discrimination manifests itself in the 
lack of accessibility to interview venues, and, in the 
case of impaired mobility, a perception that if a person 
cannot run then they present a security risk that cannot 
be safely mitigated under any circumstances.
‘The traditional mindset says if a person can’t run 
away we don’t want them here – why are you hiring 
someone in a wheelchair to work in Afghanistan? 
But if you look at it statistically and practically it’s not 
an issue. How often does an aid worker have to run 
for 1km? Never! If you have good security plans in 
place, you will relocate before the issue happens. For 
example, Terrain [tragedy in Juba] – we foresaw that 
three weeks in advance and evacuated all staff.’
Security advisor, INGO, USA
In many cases, it will be necessary for decision-makers 
within the organisation to seek expert guidance 
on the legal obligations they have to ensure the 
security of all staff and when it is possible to justify 
discriminatory recruitment in order to meet duty of care 
obligations. It is important to remember, however, that 
all discrimination must be proportionate and therefore 
a key focus should be on implementing reasonable 
adjustments. For example, if an individual 
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with a mobility impairment applied for a position which 
required the ability to drive, then it may be possible 
to delegate this responsibility to another colleague 
or recruit this person for a similar role that does not 
require driving.
What is reasonable will depend on the organisation’s 
capacity and risk appetite, the experience and multi-
faceted identity characteristics of the applicant, and the 
legal, cultural and social context of the position being 
recruited for (including the lack of local legal protection 
for that profile, if applicable). 
Managers should consider the specific needs of their 
direct reports, and establish in consultation with staff 
whether or not additional assistance is required and how 
it should be carried out. They should also assess the work 
environment of each individual, and international travel 
needs, as well as the eventuality of a rapid response in 
the event of an incident (e.g. a fire evacuation from the 
office). This level of consideration should be paid to all 
staff, not just those living with a disability.
Developing answers to the following policy-level 
questions may support decision-makers involved in  
the recruitment process of both national and 
international staff:
•  What are the security risks associated with this 
position? Are any individual profiles more at risk 
than others, and if so, why?
•  What security information specific to different  
profiles is it reasonable to provide potential 
applicants with during the recruitment phase to 
enable informed consent?
•  What personal information is it reasonable to ask 
from applicants to ensure they can be kept safe  
at work?
•  What adjustments is it reasonable to make, both 
internally and externally, during the recruitment 
process to enable persons with a variety of profiles, 
as well as abilities, to apply for the job?
•  What adjustments or mitigating steps is it 
reasonable for the organisation to make to keep 
members of staff safe in the context where the  
work will take place?
•  What adjustments or mitigating steps is it 
reasonable for individuals to make to keep 
themselves safe?
•  On what (individual, programme, organisational) 
security grounds is it reasonable to discriminate 
against certain profiles in recruitment?
Answers to these questions should be transparently 
communicated in policy documents. Organisations 
should also consider how the burden of decision-
making should be shared between the line manager, 
security focal point, HR and the individual concerned. 
Good practice from the research suggests that 
decisions should be documented to serve as proof that 
they were made transparently, systematically, using 
robust information, and with due consideration to legal 
and ethical obligations towards individuals. 
In addition, it is worth noting that there may be 
instances of positive discrimination to be considered, 
for example, the deliberate recruitment of certain 
ethnicities or other personal profiles for inclusion, 
reputation and security reasons.
  See Annex 2 for a recruitment decision-making 
scenario.
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What does inclusive security risk management look 
like in practice? There are key components of the 
security risk management framework that can be 
adapted to allow for more inclusiveness towards 
a diverse range of staff profiles. While there are 
challenges to implementing some of these, this 
section presents practical recommendations on 
how to make some key security risk management 
processes more inclusive. These recommendations 
are based on examples of good practice uncovered 
by the research as well as advice and guidance 
shared by expert advisors. All recommendations 
must be adapted to the needs and capacity of  
each organisation.
Inclusive security risk 
management: practical 
recommendations
5
Fig 9: Inclusive Security Risk Management50
  See Annex 3 for reflective questions for inclusive security risk management.
Data and information sharing
Data on different staff profiles is collected 
appropriately and confidentially, and 
used to inform security risk management 
decisions in line with security and equality, 
diversity and inclusion policies.
Crisis  
management
Crisis management plans 
consider the diversity 
of staff and address 
differing needs.
Incident 
management
Staff have multiple 
confidential ways to 
report incidents that 
are motivated by their 
personal profile. Incidents 
related to personal profiles 
are confidentially recorded 
and used to inform 
inclusive security risk 
management processes.
Travel
The differing security 
needs of travellers 
are considered and 
addressed.
Deployment
Deployments are 
informed by personal 
risk profiles, where 
appropriate, and all 
deployment decisions 
are made transparently 
and consultatively in 
line with security risk 
management and 
human resource policies 
and procedures.
Induction, pre-departure  
and training
Induction, pre-departure briefings  
and training consider diversity in 
personal profiles, and support staff 
informed consent, security-related 
decision-making, and other security  
risk management processes.
Security plans
Security plans are 
adapted to meet the 
security needs of a 
diverse range of personal 
profiles.
Risk assessments
Risk assessments consider 
diversity in risk profiles, 
include both external 
and internal threats, 
inform security plans, and 
support informed consent 
during recruitment, travel 
and deployment.
Roles and  
responsibilities
Roles and responsibilities 
in relation to security and 
diversity are clear.
Policy
The security policy 
references diversity in 
risk and reinforces the 
equality, diversity and 
inclusion policy.
50  Adapted from the Security Risk Management Framework presented in Bickley (2017).
Inclusive  
Security Risk 
Management
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5.1. Policy
The research found that few organisations consider 
staff diversity in their security policies. Only 13% of 
survey respondents agreed that their organisation’s 
security policy makes explicit reference to diversity 
in staff profiles. When security policies do include 
information about the diverse profiles of staff, gender 
and ethnicity are the most likely characteristics to be 
explicitly addressed.
Organisations should endeavour to have security 
policies that address diversity of staff profiles, 
acknowledging that diversity in profiles means  
diversity in personal risk profiles.
‘We recognise that individuals may face different 
risks or be more vulnerable to certain threats 
because of their nationality, ethnicity, gender 
identity, sexual orientation, or disability. As an 
organisation, we strive for equality in our security 
approach, and although individuals should be 
informed of specific risks they may face, and 
be advised how to minimise these risks, they 
should not be subject to any discriminatory 
restrictions. In some circumstances, however, the 
prevailing security context or specific risks to an 
individual because of their profile may require our 
organisation to take additional security measures.’
Excerpt from an equitable  
security policy
One organisation approaches equality and diversity  
in risk profiles in an innovative way, stating that aid 
workers start off with unequal personal risk levels due 
their personal profiles. The organisation, therefore, 
puts in place differentiated risk management 
procedures in order to ensure that the resultant level  
of risk is equal for all employees, regardless of their 
personal profile. Therefore, equality is the aim and 
outcome of security risk management, rather than the 
starting point (see the following security policy excerpt).
‘The organisation’s risk attitude and approach to 
security management is non-discriminatory and 
shall ensure risk treatment options produce (to 
the extent possible) equal and fair protection for 
employees and associated personnel. However, 
a specific threat may produce different levels of 
foreseeable risk for staff working in the same 
operating context, due to an individual’s diverse 
identity, e.g. gender, race, ethnic origin, physical 
and mental ability, sexual orientation, age, 
economic or social class, HIV/AIDS status, religion, 
nationality, family/marital status and political 
affiliation. We recognise that also the infinite 
range of individual unique characteristics and 
experiences, such as communication style, life 
experience, educational background and other 
variables can influence personal perspectives.
Identity can be a factor in perceiving or 
understanding risk differently, for example 
because of gender, and may make staff more or 
less vulnerable to certain threats. This may require 
different risk treatment approaches, strategies, 
procedures or resources for specific individuals 
or groups, even for those working in the same 
operating context, on the same programme.
While risk treatment may sometimes appear 
unequal (e.g. different rules between national and 
international employees), the resultant level of 
acceptable risk is the intended outcome of a non-
discriminatory approach to security management 
that aims for application without distinction or 
discrimination of any kind.’
Excerpt from a security policy  
on equality of risk treatment and 
diversity of staff
Organisational security risk management policies 
should provide clear guidance on risk appetite (also 
known as acceptable risk levels) so that security focal 
points and managers can balance individual and 
organisational risk and be clear when this risk appetite 
has been or would be exceeded.
Organisations should ensure they have an equality, 
diversity and inclusion policy that makes reference to 
the range of security needs of a diverse workforce  
and cross-references the organisation’s security policy.  
This should be complemented with robust  
anti-discrimination policies and procedures.51
51  For example, please see the British Council’s Equality Policy and Equality, Diversity and Inclusion Strategy from British Council (2018).
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Policies should be kept up-to-date to reflect 
organisational learning and changes to laws 
protecting staff with a diverse range of profiles.
‘Our policies are focused on trying to empower 
all staff to make good decisions. When it comes 
to our security policy, we aren’t trying to dictate to 
staff exactly what they should and should not do.  
We feel that it is our responsibility to give our staff 
all of the information they might need for them to 
make the right security decision.
We take this approach, even in extreme risk 
contexts like Afghanistan. There is so much 
nonsense and outdated security information that 
to try…and respond to changes in the security 
of the context, or to the individual profile of every 
member of staff, would be impossible and 
probably counterproductive.
Our policies are designed to be rigorous but 
flexible, and we focus a great deal on training and 
empowering our staff to respond to risk.’
Case Study – Afghanistan
While written policies must exist in all organisations, their 
everyday value for managers and aid workers is fully 
realised when they can be put into practice. Security 
focal points and aid workers interviewed for this paper 
complained of policy fatigue. Contributors to the research 
voiced the possibility that implementing policies that 
reference diversity in profiles can sometimes result in 
them being dismissed as another development 
industry fad that will soon pass, rather than a 
systematic weakness in the current system that must 
be addressed to ensure the safety and security of all. 
‘There is a big discrepancy between what our policies 
say we do and what we actually do. Recently we went 
through accreditation to be a ‘Two Tick’ employer so 
that we could demonstrate a commitment regarding 
the employment of people with disabilities. This was 
driven by our senior management who were going 
after funding for projects with a disabilities focus. It 
was all very calculated. All that has happened is that 
we have a sticker on our website and we have some 
new policies, but there has been no real change in 
our practice. We haven’t suddenly started recruiting 
more candidates with disabilities because there is 
still an assumption that disability = [im]mobility and 
that this would create too many security risks for our 
programme teams.’
HR manager, INGO, UK
85% of survey respondents felt that staff with minority 
profiles should be represented in security working 
groups to help shape policy and procedures. 
‘My organisation began with staff training on 
gender and security for beneficiaries before 
thinking about how we should incorporate the 
issues of staff with diverse profiles into security 
policies. We found that having had training that 
sensitised us to the issues faced by individuals,  
we were able to think more carefully and 
strategically about the fact that we all have 
different security needs. It also meant that we 
didn’t have to rely on staff members to ‘out 
themselves’ in any way to the group. As a group 
(we’re a small mission of 20 people), we were 
able to sit down together and devise a strategy 
that we were all happy with. We made sure to 
include everyone on the project, from drivers to 
administrators and frontline staff. For us, it was the 
training that got us on the same page rather than 
the policy.’
Case Study – Madagascar
Involving a diverse range of staff in the development  
of policies can support their understanding of and 
compliance with those policies. 
Policy
•  Make reference to staff diversity and the 
impact personal profiles can have on security 
in the organisation’s security policy. Establish 
guiding principles on what this means for the 
organisation in practice.
•  Keep the security policy up to date and reflect 
learnings from staff and incidents, as well as 
changes in legislation. 
•  Make clear links between the security policy 
and the equality, diversity and inclusion 
policy.
•  Consult minority profiles in the development 
of policies, as this is an effective way to better 
ensure these policies will be inclusive.
•  Complement policies with staff training and 
monitor implementation.
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5.2. Roles and responsibilities
Establishing who manages the risks of staff with a 
diverse range of profiles, and who leads on risk-
ownership and decision-making, will vary between 
organisations, but clarifying responsibilities is an 
essential component of any organisation’s security risk 
management framework.
The lack of communication between HR, programmes 
and security teams was cited by informants as a major 
challenge that leads to contradictions about addressing 
diversity in policy and practice. This can manifest 
itself in inappropriate recruitment and deployment 
decisions, differences between programme values 
and organisational values, and an absence of security 
advice provided to staff with minority profiles. One 
interviewee described this as a ‘culture clash’ based 
on differing perceptions of risk, discrimination and 
harassment within their organisation. 
In short, it often remains unclear who is accountable 
for looking at diverse profiles and security risk 
management during recruitment, deployment and 
everyday activities, for those based overseas and those 
who travel, as well as for national and international 
staff. This is particularly the case for internal security 
threats and protecting staff from harassment and 
violence instigated by colleagues.
Key to a joined-up process is: firstly, to identify roles 
and responsibilities in job descriptions; secondly, to 
include equality and diversity in key performance 
indicators; and thirdly, to build structured opportunities 
for collaborative policy development and staff training. 
In the following section, the paper presents some 
examples of good practice and possible challenges 
that were identified in the research to support 
particular roles in managing the security of staff while 
being mindful of their diversity.
Staff with security responsibilities
Organisations should consider providing specific 
training to staff on duty of care and anti-discrimination 
obligations. Security focal points should draw 
on external expertise where necessary to make 
appropriate security decisions that relate to personal 
risk profiles. Through this process, it is important to 
distinguish between what is expected at a global level 
versus country level and to highlight any issues that 
may affect national and international staff differently.
These activities can be complemented by efforts to 
improve the diversity of security staff employed in terms 
of their experience and personal identity profile.
‘We recently ran a training session in Bangkok on 
LGBTQI security for our agency staff. Many of our 
staff are from quite conservative cultures and they 
were initially very quiet when we told them about this 
panel session. We had invited a transgender trainer 
to deliver the session and although this person hadn’t 
planned to reveal they were trans, about half way 
through their session they told the audience. This had 
an enormously positive impact on our delegates, who 
almost immediately began asking questions and 
really engaging with this person’s story and what they 
had to say about security.’
Communications advisor, INGO, UK
Improving the awareness and capacity of security 
staff employed within organisations should start 
at recruitment. A risk assessment on the role in the 
particular context should be carried out and details of 
any profile specific risks (e.g. that same-sex activities 
are illegal in the country) should be provided to the 
recruiter. Conducting equality and diversity monitoring 
of applicants during recruitment and requesting 
statements about how to manage the risks of minority 
profiles in job applications and interviews are some 
of the easy ways to begin this process. Making 
inclusive security risk management a part of key 
performance indicators or annual reviews may also 
help institutionalise awareness. 
Staff with security responsibilities must also ensure that 
colleagues who experience incidents, whether from 
internal or external threats, feel confident in reporting 
their experiences confidentially. These reports must 
be appropriately stored and analysed to inform the 
organisation’s security risk management.
Security focal points should ensure that informed 
consent processes consider a diverse range of 
personal profiles, while acknowledging that aid 
workers are responsible for understanding and 
accepting the risks and demanding the information 
they need. Information disclosed by staff relating to 
personal characteristics should be securely stored  
and treated with confidentiality in line with policies  
and legal obligations.
Involving a diverse range of aid worker personal 
profiles in security risk management processes 
and systems is a straightforward way of beginning 
the implementation of an inclusive security risk 
management framework. By adopting a collaborative 
approach, organisations are more likely to pick up on 
the contradictions and gaps between different policies 
and take steps to address these gaps in ways that fit 
their culture and values.
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Human resources
HR should be included in the security risk management 
planning process to offer legal guidance on non-
discrimination and reasonable adjustments, as well as 
to ensure that staff wellbeing and care is considered. 
It is important for HR to help guide any differences 
in procedures that may need to be put in place for 
national and international staff.
Any particular risks identified during the role risk 
assessment should be incorporated into the 
recruitment process as early as possible and 
information provided to all relevant actors. Candidates 
should be able to make an informed decision without 
having to share information that is personal.
Training staff, especially decision-makers and security 
focal points, on equality, diversity and inclusion 
standards and relevant legislation is a key role for 
human resources staff. They should also gather 
diversity information of prospective employees at the 
recruitment stage and ensure that during recruitment, 
the security of particularly vulnerable personal profiles 
is considered and shared, and that security staff are 
brought in to carry out risk assessments.
If both security and human resource departments 
work closely they can ensure the best interests of 
staff with minority profiles from the perspective 
of both external and internal threats, including 
harassment, as well as ensuring non-discrimination. 
It is particularly important for HR and security staff 
to share information where these teams may keep 
separate incident reporting and management 
systems. This is particularly the case where incidents 
of a highly confidential nature, for example,  sexual 
assault, are dealt with by HR but security are never 
informed. Sharing this information, in accordance 
with confidentiality requirements, is important for the 
organisation to have comprehensive incident statistics. 
It is often not clear where incidents of harassment 
within an organisation should be reported to and 
these should be included in a shared system between 
HR and security teams.
‘There is this assumption within my organisation 
that HR is made up of a bunch of tree-huggers. So 
when we start talking about equality and diversity or 
disability rights with our security colleagues then we 
are not taken seriously.’
HR director, INGO, UK
Contributors to the research stated that there is an 
impression within the sector that HR are focused 
almost exclusively on staff recruitment rather than staff 
safety, development or duty of care. When it comes to 
reporting incidents of harassment or discrimination, 
HR staff report not having the skills to deal with these 
incidents, particularly when they happen in national 
field offices, and when incidents involve aid workers 
with minority profiles. This can be exacerbated by a 
disconnect between HR teams based at headquarters 
and those based in the field. HR staff at headquarters 
may be better equipped to support staff with minority 
profiles. Whereas HR teams at country level tend to be 
composed of national staff without the same access  
to support.
On the other hand, aid workers believe they will be 
ignored by HR or not treated confidentially if they try 
to report incidents. The research suggests that aid 
workers with minority profiles are more likely to take 
matters into their own hands by avoiding the harasser, 
quitting their job or keeping quiet rather than reporting 
to HR.
These concerns would need to be addressed by  
senior management and HR staff through training  
and sensitisation. 
Senior leadership
As role models, senior leaders, at both headquarters 
and country levels, are in a unique position to change 
organisational culture in relation to minority profiles 
and to successfully lobby for change in attitudes 
towards diversity within the sector more broadly. This 
may include lobbying donors on the importance of 
inclusive security risk management and addressing 
related funding gaps, collaborating with leaders 
at other organisations, developing networks for 
promoting diversity within organisations, and putting 
forward other role models at different levels within the 
organisation. Although an overt promotion of these 
issues may not always be possible, senior leaders and 
trustees are often best placed to exert influence and 
advocate for change.
Leaders at all levels should ensure that security and 
HR are inclusive. Inclusivity should be considered at 
headquarters level when policies are developed, 
and at country level when policies are implemented 
and country security and HR plans are developed. 
Within the sector, it is the norm to ensure all staff are 
considered equal, so many documents talk about 
staff as a homogenous group. This does not allow for 
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effective security risk management; identifying different 
risks for different staff is not suggesting that staff are 
not equal but rather that they are diverse. 
The silence on the diverse security needs of aid 
workers is likely to be linked to the fact that across 
the sector, senior leadership and boards of trustees 
of aid organisations are limited in their own diversity. 
A study of 100 top NGOs revealed that the majority 
work on behalf of non-European populations, yet 
their leaders are primarily western-educated men of 
European origin.52 When incidents of harassment are 
not reported and policies do not highlight the needs 
of minority profiles, this lack of diversity in senior 
management may lead to a cycle of non-inclusion.
‘Our board of trustees and senior management seem 
to lack any real awareness or interest in issues to do 
with diversity. We’ve started to have some realisation 
on gender and ethnicity issues, but when it comes 
to any other profiles – sexuality, disability or age for 
example, this falls on deaf ears.’
Security advisor, NGO, Sweden
#AidToo
The #AidToo movement of 2017 and 2018 has 
resulted in more information sharing on sexual 
violence within the aid sector. From allegations 
of misconduct within multiple aid organisations 
to reports of sexist cultures and widespread 
impunity, the #AidToo movement has evidenced 
that zero tolerance attitudes by senior leadership 
towards misconduct within the aid community 
are crucial to protecting both local communities 
and aid workers. The movement has also 
highlighted the particular threats aid workers  
can face from within their own organisations  
(i.e. internal threats).
Organisations should consider how they can diversify 
representation in senior leadership and on boards of 
trustees. This may require an initial audit of staff profiles 
occupying these roles and identifying steps to address 
the lack of representation of different profiles. At its 
most formal, this may take the form of assigning 
quotas (e.g. to ensure gender parity) or positive 
discrimination in future hiring practices (e.g. to address 
the underrepresentation of people with disabilities 
across the sector).
Although promoting more diverse personnel to 
leadership teams is vital, it is also important that senior 
leaders have specific line management responsibilities 
for encouraging equality, diversity and inclusion as part 
of effective security risk management. 76% of survey 
respondents were in favour of equality and diversity 
training for their existing senior leadership and boards 
of trustees. 
‘We have recently appointed someone at director 
level who has overall responsibility for equality 
and diversity. This means that she sits in on board 
meetings and strategic security meetings and 
effectively keeps us all in check. We specifically 
wanted to make ourselves in our security team a 
little uncomfortable and ask some difficult questions 
about the way that we recruit and deploy our staff. 
As a human rights-based organisation, we felt 
that it was important for us to reflect the values of 
equality and diversity in our staffing if this is what 
we are advocating for in our programmes.’
Case Study – Lebanon
A private sector company based in the UK has 
created an exchange system where trustees 
regularly hold one-to-one meetings with a staff 
member with a very different personal profile. 
On the one hand, this allows for the trustee to 
mentor the more junior staff member, and on the 
other hand, the trustee gains insight into some 
of the challenges that a particular profile – one 
different from their own – faces on a day-to-
day basis in the workplace. This is described as 
reverse mentoring.
Case Study – UK
Senior leaders in organisations play a key role in 
encouraging aid workers to raise concerns about 
their personal security no matter what their profile is, 
and ensuring that they are provided with a safe  
space in which to do so. Senior leaders should  
create equality, diversity and inclusion focal points 
and provide their staff with a number of channels  
to raise concerns.
52  El Tom (2013).
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Aid workers
Security focal points interviewed as part of this 
research mention feeling concerned that a focus on 
personal profiles increases their obligations in relation 
to staff care and diminishes aid workers’ responsibility 
for their own security. Furthermore, aid workers with 
minority profiles are reticent about what they may be 
asked to share about their private lives and fear that 
this information will not be treated confidentially or  
may lead to discriminatory decisions.
While there is an obligation on the part of the 
organisation and the security focal points to ensure 
that informed consent processes include diverse 
personal profiles, aid workers themselves are also 
responsible for understanding and accepting the risks 
and demanding the information they need to make 
informed decisions. 
Security focal points, managers and HR must ensure 
that information shared with aid workers is sufficient 
to enable them to make informed decisions, and 
that all information that staff disclose about their 
profile is securely stored and treated with the utmost 
confidentiality and in line with anti-discrimination and 
data protection obligations.
Aid workers should be encouraged to raise concerns 
about their personal security no matter what their 
profile is, and should be provided with a safe space 
in which to do so. Some organisations have opted 
for the creation of an equality, diversity and inclusion 
focal point to provide staff with a number of paths 
to raise concerns. In organisations where this is not 
the case, clear reporting mechanisms that include a 
variety of reporting channels should be established, 
and information on them explicitly disseminated to all 
staff. Guidance should be included to ensure that all 
possible reporting and management routes feed into a 
single mechanism so there is a complete picture of the 
issues for understanding and decision-making. 
Roles and responsibilities
•  Clarify roles and responsibilities in relation 
to security and diversity as part of the 
organisation’s security risk management 
framework.
•  Consider providing specific training to security 
staff on duty of care and anti-discrimination 
obligations.
•  Encourage security focal points to draw on 
external expertise where necessary to make 
appropriate security decisions that relate to 
personal risk profiles.
•  Include HR teams in the security risk 
management planning process to offer 
legal guidance on anti-discrimination and 
reasonable adjustments, as well as to  
ensure staff wellbeing and duty of care  
are considered.
•  Ensure that security and HR departments 
work closely together on security and 
diversity issues.
•  Consider how to diversify representation in 
senior leadership at HQ and country levels 
and on boards of trustees.
•  Ask senior leaders to act as role models to 
change organisational culture in relation to 
minority profiles, and to successfully lobby  
for change in attitudes towards diversity 
within the sector more broadly.
•  Provide equality and diversity training  
for existing senior leadership and boards  
of trustees.
•  Consider creating an equality, diversity and 
inclusion focal point to provide staff with a 
number of paths to raise concerns. 
•  Ensure that a diverse range of aid worker 
personal profiles are involved in security risk 
management processes and systems.
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5.3. Risk assessments
It is important that risk assessments consider 
both external and internal threats as well as their 
interrelationship. When carrying out threat and 
vulnerability analyses, it is important to note that 
threats may arise not just because someone has a 
certain profile, but also because they are perceived to 
have that profile. It is also important to bear in mind 
that profiles are multidimensional, and that risks can 
change when two or more intersections of identity 
meet (e.g. sexual orientation and ethnicity).
One organisation operating in the highly insecure 
city of San Pedro Sula in Honduras carried out a 
risk assessment and found that men, particularly 
young men, face a heightened risk of violence 
if they work in certain gang-controlled areas 
of the city. On the basis of this information, the 
organisation decided to employ only older 
women, whose profile was more accepted and 
therefore exhibited lower risk of violence from 
gang elements, to work in these areas of San 
Pedro Sula.
Case Study – Honduras
Consideration should be given to specific threats and 
vulnerabilities during the risk assessment that may 
affect particular types of individuals - for example, 
different ethnicities, local laws on sexual activity, 
limitations due to ability, etc. 
The criminalisation of same-sex relations, for example, 
carries not only the risk of legal sanctions but also 
‘extra-legal and community violence, human rights 
abuses, and broader social exclusion.’53 Some 
countries may legally criminalise same-sex relations 
but not actually convict individuals. In these instances, 
the legal framework can nonetheless serve as a useful 
benchmark to understand local attitudes towards 
LGBTQI individuals and the extra-legal risks aid 
workers may face in these contexts.
Information on these risks and potential mitigation 
measures can then be provided systematically during 
the recruitment process, for inductions and informed 
consent as well as throughout the employment cycle 
of all staff through documents and briefings, without 
targeting particular individuals. 
This process then provides a foundation for more 
specific risk assessments for specific individuals 
considering the interplay between different internal 
and external facets of identity. One organisation 
conducts personal risk assessments for each staff 
member prior to travel and thereby ensures that each 
individual’s personal risk profile is considered. 
While this individual support may not be possible for 
every organisation, it is advisable to confidentially 
collect as much information as possible at recruitment 
stage about the profiles of staff members to know 
what personal profiles to consider within the risk 
assessments. This should be complemented with 
a supportive structure that allows employees with 
security concerns about their personal profile to seek 
security advice with confidence.
Organisations should use participatory approaches 
to identify threats and assess vulnerability. This 
means involving a wide range of staff to draw on their 
personal knowledge. Taking a more collaborative 
approach is also likely to improve the reliability of 
information about different risks and challenge 
conscious/unconscious bias towards different profiles.  
Individual
(Intersectional  
identity)
Role and  
organisation
RISK
ContextFor international and 
relocated staff there needs 
to be consideration of risks 
associated with who they are 
outside of working hours as 
well as those risks directly 
related to their work.
53  IARAN (2018), p. 17. For a detailed analysis of the social exclusion risks faced by LGBTQI individuals, please see IARAN (2018).
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Collaboration does not necessarily need to stay within 
organisations. It may be appropriate to share and 
obtain information from external sources, as well 
as invite advocacy or other specialist organisations 
(e.g. CBM or Humanity and Inclusion for staff with 
disabilities, or Stonewall for LGBTQI staff) to help 
develop risk management processes as they may have 
specialist knowledge about risks to different profiles.
Failure to understand and inform staff of risks that 
disproportionately affect certain profiles may not only 
result in legal repercussions but is likely to lead to 
dissatisfied staff, high turnover and place the lives of 
staff at risk. 
5.4. Security plans
For aid workers with minority profiles, the findings from 
the research suggest that there is a strong likelihood 
that security plans in many organisations do not 
consider their particular vulnerabilities against given 
threats. Security plans may also not appropriately 
ensure mitigation and contingency measures that 
reflect the risks and needs of minority profiles. 
Security focal points and aid workers interviewed 
mentioned that they were concerned that if risk 
assessments become differentiated for different 
profiles, it will lead to situations where security plans 
dictate one rule for one profile and another rule for 
others. They argued that such an approach would 
be difficult to manage in terms of security and for 
maintaining group cohesion. This is linked with key 
informants’ uncertainty about the balance between 
what is the responsibility of the organisation and what 
might be considered the responsibility of individual aid 
workers to keep themselves safe.
The principle for any security plan should be that it 
considers all the information required to keep all staff 
safe. It is also important to bear in mind that in most 
cases security plans will provide guidance that is 
applicable to all aid workers irrespective of their profile. 
However, when mitigating measures do need to be 
differentiated, it is important that the staff affected are 
consulted to ensure their involvement in and support of 
these measures. Any alternative measures for different 
profiles should be proportional to the specific risk and 
kept under review by security focal points.
While it is not feasible, and as mentioned above not 
necessarily desirable, for security plans to provide 
detailed guidance for each specific profile, it is 
important to consider various different profiles when 
analysing threats and vulnerabilities and undertaking 
risk assessments. To achieve this, a wide cross-section 
of staff should be included in the process. This variety, 
particularly amongst national staff, is often forgotten. 
For example, cleaning and other non-skilled roles are 
often filled by minority ethnic groups who may not be 
represented amongst the more senior staff, and it is 
likely that men and women in these contexts will have 
very different exposures linked with their ethnicity. 
It is also important to consider the profiles of contracted 
staff, such as guards and drivers, who may not be the 
direct responsibility of the organisation. However, as 
Risk assessments
•  Include a variety of specific profiles in the  
risk assessment to provide sufficient 
information for informed consent during 
recruitment and deployment.
•  Collect information on staff profiles at 
recruitment stage in a systematic way that 
ensures data protection.
•  Use this information to carry out inclusive 
risk assessments, which should include both 
internal and external threats to staff.
•  Involve staff with a diverse range of personal 
profiles to develop risk assessments.
•  Use these inclusive risk assessments to inform:
 •  Job descriptions and recruitment packages
 •  Briefings that aim to ensure informed 
consent of staff
 •  Trainings
 •  Other security risk management measures, 
e.g. mitigation activities and contingency 
plans
•  Ensure inclusive incident reporting feeds into 
risk assessments.
•  Respond to issues of staff mistrust in 
confidentiality and data protection54 – 
especially around dealing with internal threats.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
54  For guidance on data protection see Mobile Data Collection Toolkit by Terre des Hommes and CartONG: https://www.mdc-toolkit.org/
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they are the most visible to the broader community, 
their profile may impact on the perception of the 
organisation. Emergency contingency plans may well 
include a key role for drivers and guards but may fail 
to consider how their personal profiles – for example, 
their ethnicity – can make it dangerous for them, and 
by extension other staff, to relocate to certain areas 
during an emergency.
For international staff, the country briefing can be the 
most appropriate forum for discussing how the security 
plans cover differing profiles and how risks may be 
different for various profiles within the specific context. 
This is not only for the personal profile of the individual 
arriving but also for others in the team, both national 
and international, as the safety and security of all is 
dependent on each individual and their behaviour  
and attitude. 
All staff should know the appropriate person and 
process to find out more information on specific 
threats, vulnerabilities, standard operating procedures, 
and contingency plans for a particular profile that may 
not be included specifically in the security plan and 
have confidence that any information shared will be 
treated with confidentiality.
Security focal points interviewed as part of this 
research remain unsure of their role in managing risks 
emerging from harassment and discrimination, and 
report not having the knowledge and skills to mitigate 
security risks for different profiles, including ensuring 
these are addressed in security trainings. For those 
who stated they wished to improve their practice in this 
area, security focal points cite a general lack of support 
from organisational leadership and the inability to find 
suitable ‘training for trainer’ opportunities. This is a gap 
that needs addressing through training, support and 
collaboration with HR.
Ensuring that both standard operating procedures 
and contingency plans deal with threats such as 
harassment and sexual violence, will help to equip  
all staff, including security and HR, with the tools that 
they need.
Digital security of aid workers in 
security plans
Managing the digital security of aid workers 
has added new and challenging risks to be 
identified, assessed and mitigated within security 
plans. To respond directly to these new threats, 
EISF published an article on managing the digital 
security of LGBTQI aid workers. This article discusses 
the vulnerability and threats faced by LGBTQI aid 
workers online, with useful and practical guidance 
for organisations to protect their staff. Despite the 
focus on LGBTQI aid workers, much of the advice 
in this article can be applied to other personal 
profiles as well.55
Security plans
•  Consider internal as well as external threats 
in security plans.
•  Include a broad cross-section of staff, 
national and international, in the security 
planning process, to understand a broad 
range of risks and the interplay between 
different facets of identity within the context.
•  Ensure that while mitigation measures 
consider staff diversity, they remain similar for 
all staff whenever possible.
•  Check that if differentiated measures are 
necessary for particular profiles, they are also 
proportionate to the specific risk.
•  Involve affected staff in discussions around 
the specific mitigation measures to ensure 
their appropriateness and compliance.
•  Provide training and support to empower 
security focal points and other decision-
makers in managing internal threats to staff 
in collaboration with HR.
•  Share security plans with staff at pre-departure 
stage, to allow them to raise concerns about 
particular risks, and provide more time to put 
in place proactive measures to address risks 
for staff with particular vulnerabilities.
•  Consider the impact of digital security risks on 
staff as part of the organisation’s security plan.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
55  Kumar (2017). 
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5.5. Induction, pre-departure briefings 
and training
Linked to the recruitment process is the induction 
of new starters. Staff induction should provide all 
new staff members with the necessary security 
information for their role and must be appropriate to 
the organisation. Individuals should feel empowered 
to access support and guidance that is appropriate to 
their profile. This induction should not ‘target’ individual 
people; instead, the general induction received by all 
staff should provide specific guidance and signposting 
that addresses diverse personal profiles. If good 
equality and diversity monitoring has happened at the 
recruitment stage, appropriate security and HR staff 
will be able to draw on this information to ensure that 
the general induction addresses the personal profiles 
that make up the organisation’s workforce.
The induction process should include components 
around diversity and inclusion, especially as part of the 
Code of Conduct and on how this links with personal 
responsibilities for security and organisational duty of 
care. The ‘onboarding’ process is the ideal place to 
discuss organisational attitudes towards discrimination 
and harassment. Exercises during the induction 
can focus on helping staff identify, establish, and 
communicate personal needs and boundaries.
During the induction of national staff (and country 
briefings for international staff), it is important to 
highlight the differences between international policies 
and local norms, and how staff are expected to 
navigate these in their day-to-day work.
  See Section 4.1. International policies versus local 
laws and norms.
In the survey, pre-deployment training and briefings 
were identified as an extremely important part of 
ensuring the security of aid workers with minority 
profiles. Aid workers interviewed as part of this 
research point to both the content and style of pre-
departure training and briefings as presenting 
challenges to their understanding of profile-specific 
risks in different contexts. Crucially, 79% of survey 
respondents felt that if information on diverse personal 
profiles is not included in pre-deployment training or 
information, then staff cannot give informed consent.
In terms of the content of security briefings, aid workers 
who contributed to this research reported experiencing 
differing levels of focus on personal profiles with the 
cultural specifics of gender and violence against 
women more likely to be included than information 
about other profiles. In terms of style, contributors felt 
that pre-departure briefings still tend to be focused on 
disseminating information about risks and their mitigation 
rather than providing opportunities for questions and 
discussion. As a result, aid workers do not always feel 
comfortable asking security-related information about 
their profile when it is not specifically addressed.
During the research, security focal points consistently 
mentioned feeling concerned that drawing attention to 
the security needs of particular profiles in pre-departure 
briefings undermines the aid worker’s potential to 
do their job. It is important therefore to ensure that 
information is provided in a generic manner that does 
not focus negatively on one particular profile.
With regards to security training, 43% of all aid workers 
surveyed reported never having received security 
training even though they felt it was appropriate for their 
job. Time and cost were cited by key informants as the 
greatest barriers to increasing the number of staff who 
receive security training both upon recruitment as well as 
regularly thereafter. Some form of security training, even if 
this is online or classroom based, is highly beneficial.56
Key informants who had received training reported that 
the overwhelming focus had been on external threats in 
hostile or fragile environments (e.g. hostile environment 
awareness training or  HEAT). In part, this is due to 
organisations prioritising these areas of security training 
because they carry the highest risk to staff. While it is vital 
that training continues to address these external threats, 
it should also consider how different profiles may be 
more vulnerable than others when threats manifest 
themselves. According to informants, current training on 
external threats primarily addresses intersecting issues 
of gender (45%), while other profiles remain largely 
unaddressed (see figure 10).
It is the responsibility of organisations to ensure that the 
personal security training that they provide for their staff 
considers the diverse profiles of staff, and where this 
is absent, to either request this from external service 
providers or to complement generic security training 
with diversity considerations through in-house training. 
In-house security trainings should also be reviewed to 
ensure inclusivity of a diverse range of profiles. Several 
organisations already do this for particular profiles.
‘During [a] security training in Lome we were all 
standing around in a circle and I was introducing what 
they should do if there is a hand grenade attack – this 
included throwing themselves on the ground and 
protecting their ears. However, when we ran through a 
demonstration the only person not doing anything was 
the participant in the wheelchair. Everybody had been 
too embarrassed to pull her out of her wheelchair.’
Security advisor, INGO, Germany
56  EISF resources can support in developing these types of trainings. See: www.eisf.eu/resources-library
EISF Research Paper 43
49% of aid workers surveyed reported that their 
organisation viewed diversity in profiles as irrelevant 
to security risk management. Security trainers who 
provide bespoke security training echoed this in their 
contributions to this research. These trainers report 
that even if they do offer training that addresses the 
internal risks to minority profiles, this tends to be the 
first area to be cut when shaping bespoke training 
programmes. Security trainers also report that they 
have been prevented from delivering training on 
security issues connected to sexuality on the grounds 
of an organisation’s faith-based values and in some 
instances due to the legal and cultural context in which 
the training was taking place.
‘As part of pre-departure training, my organisation 
provides information about the laws and lived 
experiences of being LGBTQI in the context 
where our volunteers will be sent. During one of 
these pre-departure meetings, it transpired that 
a gay volunteer was not aware that their place 
of deployment has laws where homosexuality 
is illegal. We do not prevent gay volunteers 
from being deployed to countries with anti-
homosexuality laws. Instead, we discussed the 
placement and the potential implications, and 
we spoke about this in relation to him giving his 
informed consent. Although the option remained 
open for him to travel and he initially decided to 
continue with the posting, it is my understanding 
that he later changed his mind and it was agreed 
that he would be placed somewhere else for three 
months instead.’
Case Study – Global
Small changes to course content and resources, 
such as using examples from good practice that 
include different ethnicities, people with disabilities 
and different genders/sexualities can make sessions 
immediately more sensitive to the interrelationships 
between security and individual profiles, and create 
opportunities for open discussion.
In addition to ensuring that induction, pre-departure 
briefings and personal security training courses 
consider diversity and inclusion, good practice 
examples from within the sector suggest that 
organisations should:
1)  Formally train their security focal points on 
diversity, equality, inclusion, anti-discrimination 
and how these interact with duty of care 
obligations. This should include offering security 
focal points a safe space to honestly voice their 
concerns around security, diversity, discrimination 
and bias. Security focal points should be 
encouraged and supported in acknowledging 
and overcoming any unease and discomfort 
they may feel when talking to colleagues about 
how personal identity characteristics can 
affect personal security risk and the ways the 
organisation will manage this risk.
2)  Clarify during any security-related training that 
all individuals, no matter what their personal 
profile is, will be vulnerable to threats in given 
circumstances. This vulnerability is influenced by 
an individual’s identity, as well as their behaviour, 
which is affected by their knowledge and beliefs. 
It is important to not fall into the trap of assigning 
vulnerability to specific groups, e.g. women, 
LGBTQI staff, etc.
Fig 10: Survey responses
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‘As a security trainer delivering training on 
accountability to affected populations, the issue of 
diversity is part of my everyday job. That said, I do 
find that as a safety measure for myself I often end 
up skipping discussions on sexual diversity because I 
am worried about how this will be received – which is 
silly because non-discrimination related to gender or 
ethnicity are a staple of the training I deliver. Last week 
I was in South Sudan running a training session when 
a colleague brought up homosexuality as a culturally 
divisive issue. It made me realise in that moment, that 
I don’t really know how to speak about sexuality in my 
work without feeling like I’m putting myself in danger.’
Security trainer, INGO, Spain
Security training providers should also consider the risks 
to themselves and their organisations when delivering 
training on the security of aid workers with minority 
profiles. Mitigating these risks may require proactive 
discussions about course content with the contracting 
organisation or office, the careful choice of language 
during training sessions (e.g. using the phrase different 
genders and sexualities or SOGIE rather than LGBTQI), 
and steering clear of value judgements about different 
cultural norms and values by foregrounding the 
reasonable steps necessary to keep aid workers safe.
‘We have found that when training brings ‘human 
stories’ into the process rather than simply talking 
about policy and good practice in an abstract 
way, we have a more positive and engaged 
response from trainees. That is not to say that 
offering formal learning opportunities about 
say, the security risk management framework 
is not important, it is. For example, we provide 
training on the application of equality and diversity 
legislation. We also provide blended learning 
opportunities in online chat forums that are 
moderated by someone from our team, although 
we can only staff these for a short time after the 
course has ended due to costs. We use peer-
to-peer learning and have found that this is the 
most useful way of inviting people from different 
backgrounds to challenge their assumptions 
and biases about diverse profiles. This has been 
important not only for the staff we deploy but our 
senior management too.’
Case Study – Global
Individual
(Intersectional  
identity)
Role and  
organisation
RISK Context
In training for international 
and relocated staff consider 
risks that are not related to the 
role or organisation but that 
may arise due to the interplay 
between personal profiles and 
the context.
Individual, organisational and 
context-related vulnerabilities 
interact with internal threats 
from within the organisation 
and external threats from the 
context. These interactions affect 
the risk faced by the individual 
and the organisation.
While the risks faced by local staff 
outside of their work may not be the 
responsibility of the organisation, 
their behaviour can still impact the 
perception of the organisation, with 
security consequences. 
Consider individual 
behaviour and how this 
can be influenced by 
knowledge and beliefs.
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5.6. Deployment
Many of the concerns raised during the recruitment 
process, induction and training will also arise during the 
deployment of staff.57 Three key concerns are: asking 
information about staff personal profiles, especially if 
these are ‘hidden’; ensuring deployment processes 
consider diversity and are inclusive; and deciding on 
whether to go ahead with the deployment based on 
heightened risks faced by particular personal profiles.
At times, it may be necessary to ask staff about their 
personal identity profile as part of the organisation’s 
deployment process. This is a perfectly legal request in 
the same way it is in the recruitment process. 
  See Section 4.3 Recruitment.
Staff members have the right to refuse to give 
organisations this information. However, if a member of 
staff refuses to disclose something about their personal 
identity profile, this cannot be used as evidence of 
particular characteristics and subsequent grounds for 
security decisions. That said, if this refusal to answer 
leads to an insufficient amount of information to keep 
that member of staff safe, then this may be grounds for 
an informed security decision by management. 
The principle organisations and security focal 
points should keep in mind is that they must take all 
reasonable steps to keep staff safe. For example, it 
would be reasonable for an organisation to inform a 
white staff member being deployed to northern Nigeria 
of the additional threats they may face from Boko 
Haram. The organisation, along with the aid worker 
concerned, can then decide what mitigating measures 
could be put in place and ultimately whether deploying 
this person fits within the organisation’s risk appetite. 
Linking this decision to the organisation’s risk appetite 
and overarching policies ensures that decisions are 
made systematically, rather than unilaterally, which is 
part of an organisation’s non-discrimination obligation.
Sharing security plans as part of pre-departure 
processes helps to develop clearer ideas about the 
contexts staff are due to work in, and provides staff 
with the necessary information from which they can 
give their informed consent. This also allows time 
for proactive measures to be put in place to address 
security concerns raised by staff about their particular 
vulnerabilities. It is important to remember that long-
term employees with multiple deployments may 
equally need regular pre-departure briefings as local 
circumstances and organisational policies may have 
changed since their last briefing.
Induction, pre-departure 
briefings and training
•  Include components around diversity 
and inclusion, especially as part of 
codes of conduct, in the induction 
process, and explore how these link with 
personal responsibilities for security and 
organisational duty of care. 
•  Consider the degree to which pre-departure 
training and briefings address diverse profiles.
•  Do not ‘target’ individual people in inductions 
and pre-departure briefings; instead, keep 
these generic, to be received by all staff, and 
provide specific guidance and signposting 
that address diverse personal profiles. 
•  Include examples in the security training  
from practice that relate to different 
ethnicities, people with disabilities and 
different genders/sexualities, as well as 
issues related to intersectionality. 
•  Ensure that trainers have the necessary  
skills, information and training to deliver 
sessions that are suitable for staff with a 
diversity of profiles. 
•  Formally train security focal points on diversity, 
equality, inclusion, anti-discrimination and how 
these interact with duty of care obligations.
•  Clarify during security-related training that 
all individuals, no matter what their personal 
profile is, will be vulnerable to threats in given 
circumstances. It is important to not fall into 
the trap of assigning vulnerability to specific 
groups, e.g. women, LGBTQI staff, etc.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
57  For the purposes of this paper, deployment of staff refers to aid workers who work for longer periods of time in a particular context  
(in comparison with travelling staff who undertake shorter visits to particular areas). Deployments can be one off, multiple, long or short.
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‘I’m on a two-year unaccompanied deployment in 
Bangladesh and have a same-sex partner in the UK. 
I’ve been away for long periods of time before and we 
have always managed to keep our relationship going 
thanks to Skype and so on. However, when I arrived 
at this post I realised that shared accommodation had 
walls so thin you can hear whatever the person in the 
next room is doing. This means that I cannot talk to 
my partner at home. Last week, I decided that I would 
just stay extra late in the office and make sure that 
everyone had gone home and then try to Skype with 
them. It was lovely, but at the end of our conversation 
I realised that I had been locked into the building and 
that there would be no transportation back to the 
accommodation. I ended up getting the attention of 
the security guard and he arranged a taxi for me, 
which is completely against our security protocols.’
Governance specialist, Multilateral organisation
Aid workers interviewed point to staff accommodation 
as a place where harassment from internal and 
external actors is likely to occur. Accommodation 
arrangements can exacerbate the stresses created by 
a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ organisational approach. The 
existence of accommodation as both a private and a 
public shared space means that it can be overlooked 
in risk assessments.
For aid workers with disabilities or chronic illness, 
challenges manifest themselves in the physical 
suitability of accommodation. Staff accommodation is 
cited as one of the barriers to the deployment of aid 
workers with disabilities.
Questions should be asked about the potential for 
reasonable changes to be made to deployment plans 
or whether alternative options, e.g. accommodation, 
can be found before deciding that the posting is not 
appropriate for a particular profile. For example, when 
new staff accommodation is being arranged, there are 
questions that should be asked to ensure it is suitable 
for aid workers with a diverse range of profiles. Often 
small interventions can make a big difference, such as 
turning a ground floor room into a bedroom, putting in 
a ramp or placing a rail in a bathroom.
Final decisions relating to the deployment as a result 
of a particular aid worker’s personal profile must be 
justified on the basis of clear evidence relating to staff 
security. This includes being aware of bias in decision-
making, and whenever possible, discussing complex 
deployment decisions with colleagues. If necessary, 
deploying managers, security focal points and aid 
workers should be encouraged to seek legal advice/
mediation if they are concerned about discrimination in 
security decision-making.
Post-deployment, aid workers should be encouraged 
to share their experiences with other colleagues, 
particularly if these affect a specific profile 
disproportionately, as this information can be used to 
support others about to deploy to the same context.
Deployment
•  Take all reasonable steps to keep staff safe 
and secure.
•  Keep deployment decisions transparent and 
in line with security risk management and 
human resource policies and procedures. 
Involve dialogue and discussion with the aid 
worker(s) concerned where appropriate.
•  Ensure that staff with minority profiles have the 
confidence to work with security focal points to 
ensure deployment security measures reflect 
the concerns of particular profiles.
•  Consider asking detailed questions to ensure 
the suitability of accommodation, particularly 
for staff with minority profiles. Some 
examples would be:
 •  Is it accessible to people with disabilities?
 •  How could it be made accessible to people 
with disabilities?
 •  How accessible is it for staff to get to  
and from key locations (e.g. the office  
and amenities)?
 •  Are there spaces where staff can hold 
private conversations/phone calls?
 •  Can bedrooms and wash facilities be 
securely locked?
•  Ask about the potential for reasonable 
changes to be made to deployment plans 
or whether alternative options can be found 
before deciding that the posting is not 
appropriate for a particular profile. 
•  Ensure that aid workers’ experiences post-
deployment inform pre-deployment trainings 
and briefings.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
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5.7. Travel
Much of the guidance for deployments holds true  
for travel management as well, including the need  
to openly discuss risks and mitigating measures with 
the traveller prior to travel. Informed consent is also  
a key part of travel management. Organisations  
need to consider how often briefings should be  
given and informed consent obtained, especially  
for frequent travellers.
Nonetheless, the types of risks faced by travellers who 
stay for a short period of time may be different to those 
on longer term deployment. For example, visitors are 
less likely to be worried about raising concerns related 
to internal threats, given the short duration of their visit 
and the power dynamics at play. They are also less 
vulnerable to the effects of long-term exposure to a 
particular context. For example, aid workers on short 
trips may find it easier to conceal their SOGIE if the 
local security context requires this. Those on long-term 
deployments can show signs of mental distress after 
concealing facets of their identity for prolonged periods 
of time. 
Travellers, on the other hand, are less likely to be 
aware of local norms and laws and how their 
personal profile affects their security locally. If they 
are bystanders they may also not report incidents, 
especially ones committed by colleagues, due to their 
lack of knowledge of the local situation. Pre-departure 
briefings are therefore key to ensuring the security of 
travellers, as well as informing them of their role in 
supporting the security of others while travelling. 
Inclusive risk assessments must be used to inform 
inclusive travel management. Nonetheless, the 
research has found that many organisations’ travel 
policies do not currently take into consideration 
minority profiles, e.g. transgender colleagues and 
individuals with disabilities.
‘Travel and deployment is a massive issue for us trans 
folk. Perhaps the most difficult thing that I have to 
manage is that my passport only reflects my gender 
assigned at birth and this is different to the gender 
I am. I have been refused visas and even entry into 
a country at immigration because officials have 
questioned what they view as a discrepancy.’
Aid worker, INGO, India
Minority profiles during the research felt that they 
were particularly vulnerable during in-country travel. 
Distance from structured settings, such as offices, 
increased the perceived risk of internal and external 
threats manifesting themselves with an accompanying 
decrease in outlets to seek support or report concerns. 
Travel
•  Consider the differing security risks faced by 
travellers on short visits in comparison with 
those on longer-term deployments when 
looking at mitigating measures.
•  Encourage an open culture within senior 
management and security focal points, to 
give staff with minority profiles the confidence 
to come forward and help ensure travel 
management decisions reflect the concerns 
of particular profiles.
•  Ensure in-country travel checklists include 
questions about how different profiles  
will be kept safe from both internal and 
external threats.
•  Remind all travellers of the incident reporting 
mechanisms available to them, as well as the 
consequences of harassment.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
Fig 11: Survey responses to the statement:
‘reasonable adjustments for people with 
disabilities are referenced in travel policies’
 Agree 20%
 Not sure 25%
 Disagree 55%
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5.8. Incident management
Aid workers who contributed to this paper reported 
that many, if not the majority, of the security incidents 
they experienced were motivated by hostility to an 
aspect of their profile and perpetrated by personnel 
within their own organisation.
Incident reporting and monitoring is the gateway to 
staff with diverse profiles receiving the support they 
need during and after an incident, and an important 
cog in the security system to prevent future security 
events. While incident reporting, monitoring and 
response systems have been set up to deal with a 
wide range of external threats, the internal threats 
faced by aid workers have been comparatively 
ignored. These internal threats may be ‘hate crimes’ 
or ‘hate incidents’ motivated by an aspect of an aid 
worker’s profile.
Sensitive cases
For many organisations it is not clear whether 
internal incidents should be reported through 
the security or human resources team. Previous 
research done by EISF identified that most 
incidents of sexual abuse were reported through 
a victim-centred system managed by the HR 
department. This meant that such incidents were 
never captured in the global incident statistics 
managed by the security staff and as such sexual 
violence was not identified as a significant risk.
It should be clear to all staff where responsibility for 
internal and external incident management and 
incident information management lies. Security focal 
points and HR teams would benefit from working in 
tandem to resolve any gaps and maintain a 
functioning system.
In terms of reporting, the biggest challenge facing 
organisations according to contributors to this research 
is a lack of trust in HR systems and security teams, and 
the efficacy of their reporting systems. The majority 
of all aid workers surveyed for this paper reported 
personal experience of at least one security incident 
while working in a national or local field office, yet 20% 
said they would not know when or how to report an 
incident. Only 53% of survey respondents trusted that 
an incident report would be handled sensitively and 
with their consultation.
These barriers appear in the form of complicated 
interpersonal relationships within an office, particularly 
when the security focal point is also the line manager 
of the person(s) who experienced the incident. 
There are concerns about adequate data protection 
processes to keep personal information safe, and 
when incidents stem from internal threats aid workers 
do not trust the confidentiality and effectiveness of 
whistleblowing processes. As mentioned previously, 
the 2017-2018 #AidToo movement has demonstrated 
the weaknesses of a number of organisational 
reporting systems.
‘I am a woman from Palestine and I have worked 
extensively in the Middle East. As such, I am expected 
to be a good Palestinian woman and I am often 
treated in certain ways by men from my culture. In 
my culture, this is often not seen as discrimination or 
a security problem, but in other cultures it is. I cannot 
report this as discrimination in the same way as 
someone who is perhaps from the USA.’
Security advisor, INGO, USA
For any staff member, being involved in a security 
incident can be extremely difficult, but for aid workers 
who are concealing aspects of their profiles while at 
work, security incidents pose the additional risk of that 
identity being exposed. This makes them less likely to 
report a security incident in the first place.
‘Being gay in a context where it was illegal to be gay 
meant that I didn’t feel that I could report security and 
discrimination issues. I was fortunate that nothing ever 
happened, but nothing happened perhaps because 
I let everyone assume that I was straight. For me not 
talking about my personal life wasn’t a massive deal, 
but I was only ever on quite short term postings - I 
can’t imagine what it would be like longer term.’
Consultant, Canada
A lack of trust in organisational response processes 
will contribute to under-reporting of incidents. Under-
reporting may also be linked to a fear of disciplinary 
action in case it is related to an activity that was not 
allowed. Some of these disciplinary concerns may 
have been avoided if the personal profile issues faced 
by the staff member had been discussed earlier.
Staff would benefit from being made aware not only of 
the reporting process but also being informed about 
what happens upon reporting, e.g. what happens to 
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the information, who it is shared with, what follow-up 
action will be taken for hate-based/harassment 
incidents, what information can the victim expect back, 
etc. Some organisations have established a system 
where individuals who report a security incident will not 
be disciplined even if the incident occurred because of 
or during a breach of the rules.
Victimisation
Victimisation is when a person is treated negatively 
because they have made, or are thought to 
have made a complaint. Victimisation can occur 
if an organisation does not have coherent and 
confidential reporting and complaints procedures. 
Key to mitigating the risks associated with 
victimisation in organisations are consistent 
policies and procedures, and a robust approach to 
data protection.
To build trust in incident reporting processes, there are 
several steps organisations can take. Wherever 
possible there should be more than one, and ideally 
several, member(s) of staff who are trained to receive 
incident reports. Having a choice about who aid 
workers can report to can raise the likelihood of them 
reporting incidents and near misses. It is also 
important that there is a choice when it comes to the 
method of reporting and may include online reporting 
systems and third-party reporting centres. Training for 
somebody to receive incident reports should include 
steps to ensure the survivor is not re-traumatised.
In terms of incident response, the majority of security 
focal points who contributed to this research reported 
that they do not have the necessary training to manage 
incidents motivated by hostility to different staff profiles. 
Meanwhile, HR teams reported that security incidents 
perpetrated by staff against other staff are often dealt 
with on an ad hoc basis and without following the 
correct procedures. Key informant interviews have 
indicated concern over the lack of bespoke HR training 
for HR staff in the sector, training which should consider 
the complex international nature of aid organisations 
and their work.
Good practice in organisational incident response 
should include clear disciplinary procedures for 
employee perpetrators motivated by hostility towards 
colleagues due to disability, race/ethnicity, religion/
belief, sexual orientation or gender identity (or any 
other personally motivated attack). This is a duty of 
care obligation as well as a legal anti-discrimination 
obligation. However, it is also important to bear in 
mind that disciplinary procedures are only a part of the 
package of potential responses. When organisations 
work across different cultural contexts, what is believed 
to be a security incident motivated by an aspect of 
someone’s profile in one place may be dismissed as 
perfectly acceptable in another. Examples of good 
practice suggest dialogue with staff is a possible way 
to overcome this challenge.
Dealing with internal incidents is difficult and can be 
time-consuming. Overworked managers may dismiss 
the case as inconsequential if they are not empathetic 
to the vulnerabilities of the individual affected or may 
pass it to more senior staff within the organisation 
where it becomes possible that the issue is never dealt 
with due to bureaucracy. When this happens, the 
perpetrator may assume it is acceptable to continue to 
behave in this way. Some organisations have instigated 
disciplinary measures for managers who do not take 
appropriate action in relation to internal incidents.
‘We recently had a situation in Pakistan where a 
national staff member was being harassed by 
other national staff because they believed he was 
gay. Rather than just remove the staff member(s) 
from the situation we staged an initial mediation 
with the team. This led to an impasse around 
the acceptability of LGBTQI identities; however 
the staff members involved in the harassment 
could come to see that they were affecting 
the organisation’s security and that they were 
victimising a colleague, which was against the 
code of conduct.’
Case Study – Pakistan
Through the systematic logging and analysis of data 
related to incidents affecting particular profiles, and in 
following correct data protection guidelines, the 
relationship between security incidents and particular 
profiles is made transparent, so that staff can receive 
the security information they need.
For individual organisations, and for the whole sector, 
opportunities to capture data about diverse profiles 
have to be built into all incident reporting processes. 
This might mean including more input fields within the 
organisation’s incident reporting template, and ensuring 
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an anonymous equality and diversity monitoring 
form accompanies an incident report. Collecting this 
information separately from the incident reporting form 
allows for clear and transparent data collection on 
personal security incidents that are affecting particular 
profiles, while maintaining the confidentiality of the 
person who has experienced the incident.
When completing an incident report, security focal 
points should be encouraged to ask information about 
possible hate crimes or incidents. This includes asking 
whether an incident may have been motivated by 
hostility based on race, religion/belief, ability, sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Care should be taken 
that questions are focused on what happened and 
avoid victim blaming. 
Good practice in incident 
management
Some organisations include specific questions on 
harassment and hate crimes as part of regular 
performance reviews and debriefings to build up 
a picture of incidents without relying on formal 
reporting procedures. If this information identifies 
patterns of incidents and/or an underlying 
behavioural culture, this information can be 
used to inform security plans and local incident 
reporting systems.58
Organisations might also consider conducting a 
regular anonymous survey of their staff to understand 
the scale and nature of security incidents that have not 
previously been reported. Harassment cases that 
individuals may not want to report can be indicative of 
an underlying culture that can eventually lead to more 
serious incidents if not tackled.
Incident management
•  Induct all on the use of incident reporting 
procedures, including what happens 
after an incident gets reported and how 
confidentiality is maintained.
•  Raise awareness of when an incident may be 
related to the staff member’s personal profile. 
•  Train several members of staff to receive 
incident reports.
•  Put in place a comprehensive data protection 
policy which is shared with all staff.
•  Establish clear disciplinary procedures 
for staff who engage in hostile behaviour 
towards colleagues due to their personal 
profiles, raise awareness among staff of  
the consequences of such behaviour, 
and ensure disciplinary measures are 
implemented consistently.
•  Develop an incident response checklist that 
considers diversity and incidents affecting 
staff with minority profiles.
•  Develop an anonymous equality and 
diversity monitoring form that accompanies 
an incident report template and develop 
a process on how to make use of this 
information in a confidential manner.
•  Ensure clarity between security focal 
points and HR staff on the responsibility of 
monitoring incidents between staff that may 
be motivated by personal profiles.
•  Carry out a regular anonymous survey of 
staff to understand the scale and nature of 
security incidents, including harassment that 
has not previously been reported, and to 
identify underlying attitudes.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
58  For more information and guidance on security incident information management see RedR UK, EISF & Insecurity Insight (2017).
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5.9. Crisis management
Aid workers report that there is a lack of planning for 
diverse profiles in crisis management and evacuation 
plans, irrespective of whether the crisis is the result of 
an incident related to an individual’s personal profile.
‘Recently, a group of our local staff members were 
travelling by car to a rural area when they were 
stopped at a military roadblock, soldiers were 
screaming and waving weapons but one of the 
passengers who was blind didn’t know exactly what 
was going on. The soldiers thought that he was 
refusing to comply with what they were saying, and 
it could have very easily escalated. When these staff 
got back and reported the incident they said that in 
the moment it was quite scary, but that after they got 
out the car this staff member being blind seemed to 
humanise the encounter and they were allowed to 
carry on without further incident.’
Security advisor, INGO, Germany
Rather than try to plan for every eventuality in advance, 
organisations should consider developing a list 
of contextual questions to understand how crisis 
management and evacuation protocols may need to 
be differentiated between staff. Some examples are 
provided below:
•  What is known about the profiles of aid workers 
involved in this crisis?
•  How might the legal and cultural contexts 
exacerbate the crisis for aid workers and 
organisations involved in this crisis?
•  Is this crisis the result of a real or perceived aspect  
of an aid worker’s profile?
•  What specialist advice and support do the crisis 
management team need to effectively manage  
this crisis?
•  Is the post-crisis support appropriate for the profile 
of the aid worker(s) involved in the crisis?
•  What information about the profile can be shared 
with emergency contacts? (e.g. avoid accidentally 
‘outing’ staff to a family member)
•  What additional information should be sought from 
the emergency contact? (e.g. medication, details of 
ability, etc).
Although the availability of post-crisis psychosocial 
support in the aid and humanitarian sector has 
improved in the last few years, some aid workers 
report feeling unable to accept support following crisis 
situations because they fear they will be perceived as 
weak and may even be blacklisted from future jobs. 
For aid workers with minority profiles, these issues can 
become exacerbated particularly if they are already 
concerned about concealing an aspect of their identity.
‘One colleague, who identifies as a lesbian, was 
recently raped while on deployment. She received 
emergency health care, including a PEP kit, and was 
sent from the field to the capital city. The country office 
was incredibly caring, but the psychosocial side of 
things was missing. Rape is awful no matter who it 
happens to, but this person ended up feeling unable 
to take the support offered because she was worried 
that information about her sexuality would become 
public knowledge.’
Technical specialist, INGO, UK
When it comes to identifying the necessary post-crisis 
support for aid workers with minority profiles, the 
questions and approach of the person debriefing them 
can have a profound impact on what is shared and 
the subsequent identification of necessary support. Aid 
workers caught up in a crisis should ideally be offered 
the chance to choose who conducts the debriefing. 
This will require organisations to think carefully about 
the diversity of staff available to conduct a post-crisis 
debriefing. Those conducting the debrief should be 
aware of the assumptions they make about the profile 
of the person they are debriefing.59
A growing number of organisations are now offering 
group rather than individual psychosocial support, 
and while this enables the group to discuss shared 
experiences and concerns, individuals with specific 
profiles may be unwilling to discuss their particular 
issues and unable to explain why.
By providing a list of recommended support, e.g. 
psychosocial care, with a short description of particular 
providers’ areas of expertise, this could help aid 
workers identify the most appropriate support for 
them and increase the likelihood of this support being 
utilised. This may include identifying online and face-
to-face practitioners, a range of therapeutic traditions 
and those with experience working with a range of 
personal profiles.
59  RedR UK, EISF & Insecurity Insight (2017).
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Comprehensive insurance for aid workers is a key part 
of crisis management. However, insurance policies 
assume an individual norm and may not consider 
how different profiles, especially staff with disabilities, 
can be affected. Organisations need to review their 
insurance policies through a diversity lens.
For international aid workers, one question that is 
often asked is whether insurance companies will 
pay out compensation to a same-sex spouse in the 
event of an aid worker’s death. For national staff, who 
are statistically more likely to be caught up in a crisis, 
organisations do not always provide insurance in the 
first place, let alone to same-sex partners. When they 
do, inheritance laws and customs may make it difficult 
for spouses to claim compensation in the event of death 
or serious injury of a spouse injured or killed at work. 
When asked to disclose medical information during 
screening for insurance purposes, insurance 
companies can refuse to cover aid workers with a 
wide range of medical conditions (including those who 
are HIV+) and disabilities. Staff with disabilities who 
require a carer may need additional insurance to cover 
their carer. This can present an immediate barrier that 
prevents some aid workers from being deployed or 
from working in certain contexts. Even if a carer is not 
required, organisations should consider evacuation 
plans and insurance cover for staff who may have 
special needs, e.g. those who are unable to access 
emergency evacuation vehicles, or to cover additional 
costs, e.g. if a medevac is not feasible on a commercial 
airliner and a special medevac plane is required. 
Aid workers reported as part of this research that it 
is an open secret that some people lie or withhold 
information on insurance applications or on medical 
questionnaires so that they can continue to be 
deployed. In these cases, if insurance is eventually 
triggered, these individuals may find themselves 
without the necessary cover they need.
Organisations should aim to challenge their insurance 
providers and request cover without additional 
premiums. Inductions should include information on 
insurance cover, so that if there are exclusions then 
staff are aware that they might need to have their own 
policies in place.
Crisis management
•  Crisis management teams should consider 
these key questions when planning for 
different staff profiles in a crisis:
 •  Are any additional evacuation or relocation 
measures necessary for staff with disabilities 
(natural hazard/conflict-driven/medical)?
 •  Are different crisis management 
approaches necessary when dealing with 
the abduction of a local staff member 
versus an international staff member? What 
about the additional risks associated with a 
particular profile?
 •  What steps should be taken if an aid 
worker is arrested on suspicion of same-sex 
activity in a context where this is illegal?
•  Think carefully about the diversity of staff 
available to conduct a post-crisis debriefing, 
and ensure these individuals are aware of 
the assumptions they may make about the 
profile of the person they are debriefing.
•  Provide a list of recommended post-crisis 
support, e.g. psychosocial care, with a short 
description of particular providers’ areas  
of expertise.
•  Ensure that insurance policies consider  
the diverse needs of staff based on their 
personal profiles.
•  Include information on insurance cover within 
induction programmes, so that if there are 
exclusions then staff are aware that they 
might need to have their own insurance 
policies in place.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
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5.10. Data and information sharing
There are big gaps when it comes to data about staff 
profiles within organisations. This ranges from a lack 
of disaggregated data about internal and external 
security incidents, to equality and diversity monitoring 
information in recruitment and deployment. Without 
nuanced data, security focal points are left in the dark 
about the trends and patterns of risks to particular 
profiles and do not have a coherent evidence base 
from which to direct mitigation measures. Deprived of 
data, it can also be difficult for managers to convince 
senior leaders that changes in policy and funding are 
needed within their organisation.
According to the research, the lack of data is down to 
two key issues. The first is that organisations do not 
consistently collect data, and when they do it is rarely 
disaggregated for different profiles beyond male/
female or national/international staff. The second 
issue, most commonly expressed by aid workers 
who contributed to this paper, is that data protection 
measures are not robust and there is a lack of trust that 
organisations will handle personal data confidentially. 
Consequently, aid workers with minority profiles are 
less likely to report incidents and share information 
about their profile.
  See Section 5.8. Incident management.
‘It is important to recognise that the language 
used for the LGBTQI community varies around 
the world. And, it is not just language but cultural 
practices that vary. For example in Thailand, 
gender and sexuality are often more blurry 
concepts - for example, ‘Tom’ and ‘Dee’. Neither 
of these identities is lesbian, but both will usually 
exclusively sleep with women - what is important 
about these sexual orientations is that gender 
identity and expression is closely differentiated. 
So, when thinking about instituting security risk 
management strategies in different country 
contexts, it is important to understand how these 
profiles are understood by the people who they 
will affect. The same is true for thinking about any 
internal survey, advocacy and data collection that 
an organisation might do.’
Case Study – Southeast Asia
Sharing information on the security implications 
of particular personal profiles can improve an 
organisation’s understanding of the context, and 
support their security planning and staff briefings. 
  See Section 2. Legal duty of care and  
anti-discrimination, and  
Section 6. Networks and resources.
Data and information 
sharing
•  Identify what data is already collected on 
different profiles in recruitment, deployment 
and operations, as well as incidents and  
crisis management.
•  Identify the gaps in data being collected,  
and decide what is reasonable to collect at 
each stage to ensure the safety and security 
of staff.
•  Review methods of data collection, including 
equality and diversity monitoring and incident 
reporting for a diverse range of staff profiles.
•  Identify the staff best placed to collect data in 
recruitment, deployment and operations, as 
well as incidents and crisis management.
•  Train staff in data collection, data protection 
and how to turn the data into useful 
information that will support security risk 
management processes.
•  Communicate data protection policies to all 
staff and strictly abide by these guidelines.
•  Pilot data collection methods, and seek 
feedback from aid workers with minority 
profiles.
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
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Networks and resources6
Informal collaboration and sharing of information 
between aid workers has an important place in 
developing supportive communities of practice 
for aid workers with different profiles. Many online 
communities exist offering advice on daily life, security 
and opportunities to meet and share experiences. 
Furthermore, in the absence of organisational 
guidance and advice for staff with particular profiles, 
aid workers have been proactive and taken matters 
into their own hands by creating their own informal 
networks that address a wide range of issues, 
including security, that affect different profiles. 
These include:
•  Humanitarian Women’s Network, a Facebook  
group of over 3,000 members providing  
support, mentorship and discussion of issues  
faced by women.
•  AidMamas, another Facebook group that serves as 
a discussion platform for parents in the international 
aid and development sector.
•  Fifty Shades of Aid, which is a Facebook group 
where aid workers can seek advice from others.
More formal networks and information on diversity and 
inclusion issues are also available via national and 
international advocacy groups working to secure the 
rights of people with minority profiles globally. 
The International Lesbian and Gay Association 
(ILGA) is a worldwide federation of more than 
1,200 member organisations from 132 countries, 
campaigning for LGBTQI rights. They provide up-to-
date information on criminalisation, recognition and 
protections for individuals who identify as LGBTQI.60 
ILGA have developed a website that maps sexual 
orientation laws globally, which can be used to inform 
risk assessments.61
The LGBT Aid and Development Workers website 
aims to provide opportunities for aid workers to 
network and discuss relevant issues. The website 
contains lists of national LGBTQI organisations and 
an overview of some inclusive policies used by 
humanitarian and development organisations.62
The UK LGBT charity, Stonewall, has developed  
‘Safe Travel Guidelines’, a guide which targets 
organisations, rather than individual LGBTQI aid 
workers, and focuses on how organisations can best 
support their LGBTQI staff who need to travel for work.63 
The guidelines also provide some examples of best 
practice where organisations have altered their 
practices and addressed barriers to the safe travel of 
their LGBTQI staff members. Stonewall also has useful 
information for transgender staff64 as well as country 
briefings that outline the legal, socio-cultural and 
workplace situation for individuals who identify as 
LGBTQI in specific countries.65
60  International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association: http://ilga.org/
61  ILGA (2017).
62  LGBT Aid and Development Workers: http://lgbtdevworkers.com/
63  See Stonewall (2017).
64  See for example Stonewall (2016).
65  Stonewall (2018).
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Human Rights Watch have developed similar LGBTQI 
relevant country profiles.66 And the United Nations 
‘Free & Equal’ campaign has useful resources and 
information on LGBT rights.67
CBM has a number of useful resources for 
organisations employing or working with individuals 
with a disability. Their publication ‘Guidelines for 
Travelling with a Disability’ that provides practical 
first-hand advice and best practice recommendations 
from people with disabilities.68 The guidelines highlight 
the challenges that can be faced by aid workers with 
disabilities when travelling and offer tips and advice 
on how organisations and aid workers with disabilities 
can overcome them. The document also discusses 
some of the cultural perceptions of disabilities that aid 
workers may come across when travelling.69
Organisations should also consider using traditional 
humanitarian and security coordination bodies to 
share information on incidents and issues affecting 
minority profiles so this focus becomes mainstream.
66  Human Rights Watch (2017).
67  See: https://www.unfe.org/learn-more/
68  CBM (2017).
69  CBM has also developed security guidelines for people with albinism. See van Herwijnen, Ritchie & Eaton (2017). 
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The security of aid workers is influenced by the interplay 
between where they are, who they are, and their 
role and organisation. An aid worker’s vulnerability 
to internal and external security threats is, therefore, 
affected by their identity profile and this has implications 
not only for the security of the aid worker but also for 
their colleagues and the employing organisation. 
The current standard practice within aid organisations 
of a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ approach to managing staff 
security does not meet duty of care obligations to  
all staff. This approach notably fails to account for 
internal threats faced by aid workers because of their 
identity profile. 
The aid sector’s commitment to the principle of equality 
can partially explain why decision-makers treat aid 
workers as a homogeneous group and why many 
organisations do not currently engage in discussions 
around diversity in risk. However, while organisations 
must respect the principle of equality, decision-makers 
must also acknowledge the heterogeneity of aid 
workers in order to understand diversity in personal 
risk profiles and improve the security of their staff.
Aid workers with minority profiles who contributed to 
this research paper have stated that they would like aid 
organisations’ security risk management processes to 
become more inclusive, as well as more sensitive to 
discrimination, harassment, victimisation and violence 
from fellow aid workers. 
However, security focal points are wary of considering 
diversity in a systematic manner either because they 
see diversity as irrelevant to security risk management 
or because they fear infringing individuals’ rights to 
privacy and non-discrimination.
In high-risk situations, duty of care obligations may 
compel decision-makers within organisations to 
ask personal profile questions, which staff may 
refuse to answer. Senior members of staff may 
also be compelled to make decisions that indirectly 
discriminate based on personal profiles in order 
to meet duty of care obligations. These types of 
decisions must be taken transparently, systematically, 
proportionately, and on the basis of sound security 
information in pursuit of a legitimate aim.
Learnings from the research indicate that decisions that 
are based on an aid worker’s personal characteristics 
should be made in an open, transparent and 
consultative manner with the involvement of the 
individual affected whenever possible. 
To meet both their duty of care and anti-discrimination 
obligations – from both a legal and an ethical 
perspective – organisations should take concrete steps 
to develop inclusive security risk management systems 
and processes. These inclusive processes should be 
transparently communicated to all staff.
Organisations have an obligation to know the 
risks that particular identity profiles may face in 
particular contexts and to inform staff of these during 
recruitment, prior to travel and/or before undertaking 
a new activity. Security policies and plans should 
also involve, to the greatest extent possible, an 
open dialogue with staff with minority profiles in 
order to jointly look for solutions, including putting in 
place reasonable adjustments for aid workers with 
disabilities. The entire security risk management 
process should consider the internal threats faced  
by staff.
Policies on security, equality, diversity and inclusion 
should make reference to the diverse risks staff may 
face due to their personal profiles and provide decision-
makers with principles to guide difficult decisions related 
to the personal characteristics of employees.
Security training for aid workers must be adapted to 
meet the needs of individuals with a diverse range of 
profiles. Security focal points, managers and HR staff 
require adequate training on anti-discrimination and 
duty of care legislation, and how these obligations 
interact. Training can help ensure that security 
decisions that disproportionately affect one profile 
Conclusion
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over another are made with respect for ethical and 
legal obligations and are carried out systematically 
and transparently.
Organisations must ensure transparency and 
accountability in relation to incident reporting and 
response, particularly when incidents relate to staff 
members’ personal profiles. Employees should 
understand the organisational processes involved 
in preventing and responding to incidents, including 
those related to internal threats, and be informed  
of what will happen to their information after  
reporting an incident.
Efforts to mainstream diversity into an aid organisation’s 
security risk management framework – from policy and 
risk assessments to travel and crisis management – 
must be complemented by safeguarding measures, 
disciplinary procedures, and activities that aim to 
change organisational culture towards including and 
protecting minority profiles.
Developing an inclusive approach to aid worker 
security may seem daunting and complex at first,  
but examples shared in this paper aim to demonstrate 
that many practical solutions already exist and are 
straightforward and inexpensive.
In order to truly meet the aid sector’s commitments 
to equality and diversity, aid organisations must first 
acknowledge that aid workers’ personal risk profiles 
are not the same. Inclusive security risk management 
allows decision-makers to recognise and address 
diversity in risk profiles. Decision-makers can thereby 
ensure that despite their diversity, all staff will face an 
equal level of acceptable risk - no matter where they 
are or who they are.
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Annex
1 External threats, vulnerability of profiles and risks to individuals 
and organisations70
1: External threats (legal)
External threats  
(legal)
Vulnerability of minority profiles 
(examples)
Risk to individual Risk to organisation
Criminalisation of profile SOGIE: Sexual activities between people of the same sex are illegal and are  
punishable with imprisonment, corporal punishment or death.
Ethnicity: It is illegal to wear certain clothing (e.g. niqab and burqa) in public spaces.
Disability: Criminalisation of behaviour exhibited by people with autism spectrum 
disorders, which in some cases can be explained by their disability.
Employees are at risk of harassment, arrest, and in some 
cases, death by authorities.
Organisations can be expelled from the context for failing to 
ensure staff abide by country laws. The impact may also be 
reputational and undermine the organisation’s position within 
the country.
Lack of protection Diverse profiles: May fall victim to discrimination and/or harassment both in  
the workplace and in the field.
Disability: People with disabilities are not protected by the law or entitled to  
reasonable adjustments.
Employees can be overlooked for promotion or unfairly 
dismissed for being who they are.
Employees are refused accommodation or other services.
Employees may be harassed or attacked and have no 
legal redress to bring perpetrators to justice.
Organisations face the possibility of being held liable for 
discrimination if staff can prove ties to headquarters where 
discrimination laws are different from the host context. This 
also has reputational risks for the organisation, where such a 
situation may undermine its relationship with authorities, host 
communities, staff and donors.
Lack of recognition SOGIE: Same-sex relationships (including legal marriages) and parental rights  
are not recognised.
SOGIE: Transgender identities are not legally recognised.
Ethnicity: Ethnic identities are not recognised.
Disability: Hidden or learning disabilities are not recognised or supported.  
Carers or personal assistants are not recognised or supported.
Carers, dependants and partners may be unable to 
relocate with employees or are not appropriately included 
in crisis management response plans.
Inability of staff to access appropriate ID cards, resulting 
in travel and work restrictions (e.g. trans staff with 
appropriate gender on ID cards).
Reasonable adjustments are not made for staff with 
disability (e.g. screen, coloured paper).
Organisations face the possibility of being held liable for 
discrimination if staff can prove ties to headquarters where 
discrimination laws are different from the host context. This 
also has reputational risks for the organisation, where such a 
situation may undermine its relationship with authorities, host 
communities, staff and donors.
Organisations lack diverse skills and knowledge if diverse 
profiles cannot work safely in the operating context.
Lack of other rights SOGIE: Some staff banned or unwelcome in gender-assigned facilities (e.g. toilets)  
that do not correspond to their gender identity or perceived identity.
Ethnicity: Some staff may lack access to services or are placed at higher risk  
for using particular facilities.
Disability: Access to services and facilities is not possible for people with  
physical limitations.
People of minority profiles face harassment or cannot 
adequately access services or use facilities.
Organisations face the possibility of being held liable for 
discrimination if staff can prove ties to headquarters where 
discrimination laws are different from the host context. This 
also has reputational risks for the organisation, where such a 
situation may undermine its relationship with authorities, host 
communities, staff and donors.
Organisations lack diverse skills and knowledge if diverse 
profiles cannot work safely in the operating context.
Restriction of rights SOGIE: Restrictions on discussing or disclosing LGBTQI related activities or opinions.
Ethnicity: Lack of, or limited, safe spaces to carry out cultural and religious practices.
Diverse profiles: Cannot access surgical interventions, or interventions are performed 
without adequate consultation and consent.
People cannot participate in activities they value or 
perform activities according to their identity.
Risk of harassment or arrest of aid workers.
Organisations face the possibility of being held liable for 
discrimination if staff can prove ties to headquarters where 
discrimination laws are different from the host context. This 
also has reputational risks for the organisation, where such a 
situation may undermine its relationship with authorities, host 
communities, staff and donors.
Organisations lack diverse skills and knowledge if diverse 
profiles cannot work safely in the operating context.
70  Adapted from Stonewall (2017) 
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External threats, vulnerability of profiles  
and risks to individuals and organisations 
continued
2: External threats (non-legal)
External threats  
(non-legal)
Vulnerability of minority profiles 
(examples)
Risk to individual Risk to organisation
Societal attitude SOGIE: Staff may be expected to keep their sexual orientation and  
gender identity to themselves.
Ethnicity: Staff may face discrimination in relation to hiring practices or  
when liaising with host communities and authorities. They may also find that  
local assumptions and perceptions affect their access and movements.
Disability: People with disabilities are viewed through a medical model and  
therefore are perceived solely as a burden.
Staff at higher risk of isolation with risks to mental health 
and overall wellbeing.
Potential for higher risk behaviour brought about  
by isolation.
Lack of job and promotion opportunities. 
Restrictions on travel and external engagement.
Staff face discrimination.
Social exclusion of staff.
The organisation’s workforce lacks diversity and subsequently 
programmes may not cater for all those in need.
Levels of hate ‘crime’ SOGIE: Uncertainty about how hate crimes will be interpreted by legal context.
Ethnicity: Hate crimes rise during elections or at certain times of the year.
Risk of falling victim to hate crimes.
Living in fear can result in deteriorating mental health.
After an incident, e.g. an attack, uncertainty on  
how to report incidents, including reluctance to  
report altogether.
Inability of the organisation to recruit a diverse workforce and,  
as a result, programmes may not cater for all those in need.
There may be a lack of appropriate reporting systems.
Implications for the organisation’s reputation and associated risks.
Visibility in public life Diverse profiles: Are not visible in public imagery, in profile descriptions  
or in high level staff.
Higher risk of isolation of staff with minority profiles. 
Lack of recognition of identity, and particular staff profile 
needs not catered for.
Inability of the organisation to recruit a diverse workforce and  
as a result programmes may not cater for all those in need.
There may be a lack of appropriate reporting systems. This may 
result in the organisation being caught unaware of threats due  
to a lack of visibility about diverse profiles.
Implications for the organisation’s reputation and associated risks.
Availability of community 
support
Diverse profiles: Are isolated from local communities and local colleagues. Staff may attempt to access support networks online or 
access support elsewhere, with the potential of obtaining 
false/flawed information or falling victim to predators.
Staff may face mental health issues, including depression, 
stress and anxiety.
Inability of the organisation to recruit a diverse workforce, or to 
deploy these individuals to local communities, and as a result 
programmes may not cater for all those in need.
There may be a lack of appropriate reporting systems within  
the community. This may result in the organisation being  
caught unaware of threats due to a lack of visibility about  
diverse profiles.
Implications for the organisation’s reputation and associated risks.
Access to specific services Diverse profiles: Can face physical barriers to accessing services,  
e.g. health clinics or religious spaces. This may include a lack of  
trained staff to assess need or communicate with the individual.
Staff health issues may not be addressed.
Staff may not be able to take part in social activities,  
with implications for staff wellbeing.
Inability of the organisation to recruit a diverse workforce, or 
to deploy these individuals to certain locations, and as a result 
programmes may not cater for all those in need.
Implications for the organisation’s reputation and associated risks.
Risk of breaching duty of care obligations if organisations cannot 
find appropriate services for staff, especially medical support.
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Annex
2 Recruitment decision-making scenario
The box below provides a real-life scenario that requires a decision-maker within the organisation  
to balance duty of care with anti-discrimination obligations in a recruitment decision.
Scenario
On the basis of information provided by the organisation’s security focal point in-country, the recruiting  
manager of an international NGO decides not to recruit a white gay aid worker from the UK to work in a  
field office in Uganda after finding out that homosexual activity is illegal and carries the death penalty there.
Question: Is the recruiting manager fulfilling their duty of care  
or is this an example of discrimination?
Duty of care
Duty of care requires organisations and staff to take all 
reasonable steps to keep themselves and colleagues safe. 
From a duty of care perspective, the security focal point has 
risk assessed this deployment and discovered that the impact 
of the legal threat is potentially higher for this aid worker than 
a heterosexual colleague. The recruiting manager bases their 
decision on this security information. The next question is 
whether this risk can be mitigated in some way.  If the security 
focal point and recruiting manager together decide that the 
risk cannot be adequately mitigated, and the recruitment 
and subsequent deployment of this aid worker exceeds the 
organisation’s risk appetite, then they are fulfilling their duty of 
care to keep this aid worker and the organisation safe.
Discrimination
Discrimination is when one person is treated less favourably 
than another due to a perceived or genuine aspect of their 
personal profile. From a discrimination perspective, this aid 
worker is being prevented from doing a job on the grounds 
of their profile and is therefore being discriminated against. 
Discrimination in this case may be ‘direct discrimination’ by 
the recruiting manager if the decision applies solely to that 
individual. It is ‘indirect discrimination’ if the security focal point 
is following organisational policy and the restriction would 
apply to all candidates with that particular profile.
Answer: Both
There may well be times, particularly in high or extreme risk contexts, when certain profiles are not able to work in given 
contexts or are required to follow a set of rules, policies or practices that set them apart from others to keep them safe.
The important question to answer is whether the actions on the part of the decision-maker are proportionate to the risk, and 
whether it is possible to take less or completely non-discriminatory alternative actions. One question that must be answered, is 
what mitigation may have been possible to allow this aid worker to be recruited and fulfil their role. This question can only be 
fully answered with the knowledge and input from the aid worker due to be recruited and when other aspects of their profile 
have also been considered. 
A second question that must be answered is whether the recruiting manager was making a unilateral decision, or is this 
decision supported by sound security information and advice from the relevant security focal point and supported by transparent 
organisational policy. Without policies in place, the recruiting manager is at greater risk of being accused of discrimination.
An acceptable solution to this dilemma is to provide information about this additional security risk in the job description and 
in person during the recruitment phase, and to allow the candidate to discuss this openly with the recruiting manager and a 
security focal point, highlighting the risks, the mitigation measures, and the contingency plans. The candidate may choose 
to not go ahead with the recruitment. If the candidate decides to continue with the recruitment and the recruiting manager 
decides the risk is too great to go ahead, despite discussing possible mitigation measures with the relevant security focal point, 
then the manager should seek alternative options for the candidate, e.g. deployment to another context or another role.
NB: If decision-makers are uncertain about the balance between duty of care and discrimination, they should seek legal  and 
HR advice during this process to ensure compliance with legal obligations.
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Annex
3 Reflective questions for inclusive security risk 
management
Governance and accountability  
(in relation to equality, diversity  
and inclusion)
•  How is diversity reflected in your senior 
management team, security personnel and on your 
board of trustees?
•  Who has overall responsibility for equality and 
diversity within your organisation?
•  What monitoring and evaluation of equality and 
diversity do you do within your organisation?
•  To what extent might local/national/international 
equality and diversity ‘champions’ be useful to  
your organisation?
•  Do job advertisements, descriptions and key 
performance indicators make reference to equality 
and diversity?
•  What opportunities are there for HR and security 
focal points to meet and discuss the dilemmas and 
issues they face?
Policies and principles
•  Does your organisation have a security policy?
•  Does your organisation have an equality and 
diversity policy?
•  Do the equality and diversity policy and security 
policy mutually inform or contradict each other?
•  Does the security policy make specific reference to 
an equitable and inclusive security approach?
•  What does your code of conduct say about 
discrimination?
•  Who takes part in developing your security and 
equality and diversity policies? And how can these 
people be brought together?
•  In what ways does your security policy reflect your 
organisation’s wider principles of human rights, 
the core humanitarian standard, or faith-based 
approaches?
•  What steps does your organisation take to ensure 
that policies (and other documentation) are made 
accessible to staff with disabilities?
•  How does your organisation tackle online security 
risks to all staff?
•  Does your organisation have a ‘transitioning at 
work’ policy to support transgender members  
of staff?
•  Is there anything that could be seen as 
discriminatory in your security policy?  If yes, how is 
this justified?
•  Do your policies address the possibility of conflicts 
between national laws and norms with the 
organisation’s values?
•  Do your policies reflect the interplay between 
security, equality, diversity and inclusion in relation  
to recruitment?
Security plans
•  Where do you source information about the legal and 
cultural risks that affect staff in different contexts?
•  Do you routinely include information about security 
risks for staff with a diverse range of profiles, 
particularly minority profiles? 
•  Do you only respond to this need when a staff 
member raises a concern? 
•  Do your country security plans and visitor guidelines 
include information/guidance on the specific risks to 
staff with minority profiles?
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•  Is information on risks for staff with specific  
profiles provided to HR for recruitment and  
deployment decisions?
•  Do donor agreements reflect your organisation’s 
commitment to equality, diversity and inclusion?
•  Do partnership agreements reflect your 
organisation’s commitment to equality, diversity  
and inclusion?
•  What opportunities are provided for partners  
to discuss their opinions on equality, diversity  
and inclusion?
Awareness and capacity building
•  How does your pre-deployment training cover the 
security needs of diverse staff, particularly those  
with minority profiles?
•  What internal processes link equality and  
diversity monitoring information at recruitment  
with security briefings?
•  How is diversity included in security briefings?
•  Do you request that (externally provided) security 
training covers the relationship between equality 
and diversity and security risk management?
•  Do you make assumptions about participants when 
you run security training sessions?
•  How can your organisation embed equality and 
diversity in funding requests that cover security  
risk management?
Travel management
•  When recruiting for a post that will involve travel, in 
what ways are candidates informed of the specific 
threats to their personal profile, and specifically 
encouraged to apply for certain roles due to their 
personal profile?
•  How does your organisation convey that they  
are willing to make reasonable adjustments in  
travel support?
•  How is diversity in personal profiles included in risk 
assessments for staff accommodation?
•  Where does your organisation look for information 
about the risks to staff with a diverse range of 
profiles, particularly minority profiles?
Incident monitoring
•  What equality and diversity monitoring data do you 
collect alongside incident reports?
•  How do you reassure staff that incident reporting 
will be handled sensitively?
•  How does your monitoring of security incidents 
and equality and diversity inform your subsequent 
security policies and practice?
Crisis management
•  Do terms of reference for crisis management  
teams embed responsibilities for equality, diversity 
and inclusion?
•  To what extent are incident protocols differentiated 
according to the effects on different profiles?
•  How sensitive are external assistance providers to 
crises involving minority profiles?
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